Dear Bruno and Brent: (not quite sure which 'open' par belongs to whom, since they are open in Bruno's text as well as in Brent's - but that is irrelevant at this moment: I don't intend to "argue") I thank you for reflecting to my scribblings in a very professional spirit. I apologize for boring you by remarks (questions) derived from a different worldview (and vocabulary) from what you apply. I decided several times NOT to barge in, yet am fallible and in-disciplined. Sorry.
To Bruno's "they work well": I use 'almost' because of flaws that occur occasionally. Reason in my view: our so far learned (you may call it: observable, see below) 'world' is a portion of the wholeness and the entire totality is in relational exchange with everything - including those items we already know about. The rest of the interference is 'surprising' (i.e. out of our rulely - knowable expectations: considerable as flaws). Observer: I generalize the term to anything getting into relational connection with anything else, not restricted to 'conscious' (horribile dictu: "human"?) observers. So I would not call 'it' a "he". My question was: can a mental object (thought?) be observing in my sense? (That would be an extension to a 'physical' view). I appreciate Brent's remark restricting the collapse etc. as part of the "DESCRIPTION". And I loved the sweet fairy-tale: *"God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;)" *by the bearded supernatural inventor, way before it was applicable to human-identified time concept. Thank you. Insanity: what is sanity? I admit that your (and Brent's etc.) positions are the best available and decent, I am stubborn (maybe I learnt insufficient math-physics to join the choir) but look now from a perspective above my head into an unlimited complexity from which certain 'aspects' (maybe derived by the actual state of our understanding only) are composed into limited models for ourselves to think WITHIN. That is our perceived reality (just a word) and subject to relations from yonder. Your boss, the universal machine (yes, it is feminine in French, Latin and German) is THERE, beyond my imagination and I don't force my flimsy mind to identify it in MY terms. She may be more than I can fathom. So I sit in my own schizophrenia: live in a restricted pool of ideas and think about an unrestricted everything beyond my capabilities. I don't want to compromise, nor to accept what seems incomplete. I hope to bother you less with my nightmares in the future (but don't count on it). . John M On Fri, Apr 29, 2011 at 3:57 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 4/29/2011 9:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Hi John, > > > On 28 Apr 2011, at 21:40, John Mikes wrote: > > Dear Bruno, allow me to interject some remarks (questions?) indented and > starting (JM): > John > > On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 7:49 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> >> On 28 Apr 2011, at 13:10, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> Bruno said, " If not you would give to consciousness the ability to >> suppress branches in the quantum multiverse (like with the wave collapse), " >> >> Exactly what I am asking. Is this a possibility? >> >> >> >> It is a logical possibility. But it is inconsistent with the >> computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science, or with the idea that >> QM is a universal theory. >> > *(JM): how about that computationalist hypothesis being false > and QM being-NOT-a universal theory?* > > > In that case we must search for another theory in mind studies, and another > theory in physics studies. But today, they work well, especially together, > and the more we study them, the more astonishing they look. I like them, > because I like to surprises. I like theories which shake my prejudices. > > > > > > >> The collapse of the wave has been defended during almost one century and >> nobody can explain it. The observer can no more be described by quantum >> mechanics, nor by digital mechanism. >> > * (JM): so be it. Is there a 'collapse' of a function? is an > 'observer' reaistic as thought?* > > > A theory can always be false. The problem of the collapse of the wave > function is that it has to violate relativity, or physical realism or logic. > Without collapse, an observer is at least as realistic than the objects of > his study. The observer does not need a special status, he belongs to the > world he is observing. > > > Note that is exactly contrary to some interpretations of QM, e.g. Bohr's > > http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/1009/1009.4072v1.pdf > > and more recently Asher Peres > > http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9711/9711003v1.pdf > > The "collapse" of the wave function is easily explained as an epistemic > event in one's description of the system. > > Brent > > > > With comp also. This allows monism: the researcher is embedded in the > field that he searches. No need of a cut between subject and object. No need > for an ontological dualism. > > > > >> But it is not a logical contradiction. It is just not plausible, a bit >> like the idea that God made the creation in six days some millennia ago. We >> can't contradict such a statement, but it necessitates a very complex theory >> with many "corrective principles" which will be seen as ad hoc. >> *(JM): how were the "SIX DAYS" measured before OUR time-frame was >> 'created???* >> > > God created a little mechanical clock to begin with, and six days was for > him just 6 * 24 * 60 * 60 seconds ;) > > > > In science we never know-for-sure the truth. There are no certainties. >> *(JM): conventional science, that is. We cannot speak for the >> future*. >> > > We can, accepting a theory. With comp we can explain that science will > never know for sure, and that knowing anything for sure, except one own > consciousness, is a case of insanity. > Of course comp might be false, in which case you might be right. Note also > that there are many futures, both on the first person plane (hell, heaven, > the Tibetan intermediate realms, etc.) and on the third person plane, as > described by the wave function. All this by *conjecturing* comp and/or QM. > > > > > With computationalism we have a quasi complete explanation of >> consciousness, capable of justifying completely its own incompleteness, and >> a complete explanation (although not yet completed, to be sure) of the >> origin of the appearance of physical reality (both the quanta and the >> qualia). >> >> To allow consciousness to make the other branches, or the other >> computations disappearing, seems to me a bit like making a problem much more >> complex for unclear reason. >> >> But comp might be false, that is a possibility. Indeed, if comp is true, >> it has to be a possibility. Comp, like consistency in arithmetic entails the >> possibility of its refutation, and should never been taken as an axiom, just >> a meta-axiom, or an act of faith. If not, we become inconsistent. >> > * (JM): thanks, Bruno, for the wisdom.* > > > You can thank the universal machine. I am just her messenger ;) > > > > >> > > >> My point here is just to explain that IF comp (DM) is true, THEN physics >> is a branch of machine's psychology/theology/biology. I don't pretend this >> is obvious. >> >> I do find comp plausible from the currently available data. Both comp, the >> hypothesis, but also through its multiverse/multidream consequences. >> >> Bruno >> > *(John)* > > > Have a good day, John, > > Bruno > > > > > >> >> >> Richard >> >> On Thu, Apr 28, 2011 at 6:55 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> >>> Richard, >>> >>> On 26 Apr 2011, at 16:08, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>> Bruno, >>> >>> If DM results in a cosmic consciousness that can make choices, >>> could not it choose to select a single world from the many possible >>> worlds? >>> Richard Ruquist >>> >>> >>> Suppose that you are read (scanned) at Brussels, and reconstituted in W >>> and M. Your consciousness will select W, in W, and will select M, in M. Both >>> happenings will happen, if I can say. >>> >>> You can decompose a "choice of going to M" into such a duplication + >>> killing yourself in W, or better: disallowing the reconstitution to be done >>> in W. Likewise, you can choose to go to M, by deciding to "not take a plane >>> for W, nor for any other places". That is why a choice is possible in the >>> MW, through a notion of normal world (or most probable relative world) that >>> you can influence by the usual "determinist" means. If not you would give to >>> consciousness the ability to suppress branches in the quantum multiverse >>> (like with the wave collapse), or even less plausible, to suppress the >>> existence of computations in the arithmetical world, which is as impossible >>> as suppressing the existence of a number. >>> So the choices are relative to the state you are in, but even the cosmic >>> consciousness cannot chose between being me and someone else. It can, or has >>> to be both. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 26, 2011 at 7:29 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 25 Apr 2011, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>> On 4/25/2011 7:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 23 Apr 2011, at 17:26, John Mikes wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> Brent wrote (and thanks for the reply): >>>>>>> >>>>>>> (JM):...In such view "Random" is "I don't know", >>>>>>> Chaos is: "I don't know" and stochastic is sort of a >>>>>>> random. >>>>>>> ..." >>>>>>> >>>>>>> BM: Not necessarily. Why not free-up your mind to think wider and >>>>>>> include the thought that some randomness may be intrinsic, not the >>>>>>> result of >>>>>>> ignorance of some deeper level? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> OK. (BM = Brent Meeker, here, not me). But I agree with Brent, and a >>>>>> perfect example of such intrinsic randomness is a direct consequence of >>>>>> determinism in the computer science. That is what is illustrated by the >>>>>> iteration of self-multiplication. Most observers, being repeatedly >>>>>> duplicated into W and M, will have not only random history (like >>>>>> WWMMMWMMMWWWWWMWMMWWM ...) but a majority will have incompressible >>>>>> experience, in the sense of Chaitin. Self-duplication gives an example of >>>>>> abrupt indeterminacy (as opposed to other long term determinist chaotic >>>>>> behavior). >>>>>> >>>>>> In particular, the empiric infered QM indeterminacy confirms one of >>>>>> the most startling feature of digital mechanism: that if we look below >>>>>> our >>>>>> computationalist subtitution level , our computations (our sub-level >>>>>> computations) are random. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> This is a consequence of the no-cloning theorem, which in turn is a >>>>> consequence of unitary evolution of the wf. It is curious that the >>>>> deterministic process at the wf level implies randomness at the level of >>>>> conscious experience. >>>>> >>>> >>>> This is easily explained by the digital mechanist assumption, through >>>> self-duplication. No need of QM, except for a confirmation of comp. >>>> Note that he non cloning theorem is itself a consequence of digital >>>> mechanism. In fact all the weirdness of quantum mechanics are obvious in >>>> digital mechanism (DM, which does not postulate QM). Indeed DM entails >>>> first >>>> person indeterminacy, first person plural indeterminacy (many worlds), >>>> first >>>> person non locality, and it is an "easy" exercise to show that it entials >>>> non cloning of matter, and non emulability of matter (and thus the falsity >>>> of digital physics a priori). >>>> >>>> It is still an open problem if unitarity follows from comp, as it should >>>> if both DM and QM are correct. But the room for unitarity is already there, >>>> because the logic of arithmetical observability by machine/numbers is >>>> indeed >>>> a quantum logic. Comp can be said to already implies that the bottom >>>> physicalness is symmetrical and non clonable. The arithmetical qubit cannot >>>> be cloned nor erased (nor emulated by a digital machine, and this is >>>> perhaps >>>> not confirmed by QM!). >>>> >>>> Bruno Marchal >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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