On 5/19/2011 4:31 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
Hi Scerir and Friends,
Thank you for posting this link to N. Gisin’s paper. In it Gisin makes a very eloquent and forceful argument against MWI based on the experience of free will.


Doesn't seem very forceful to me. There's a contradiction between the MWI and free will because the MWI assumes deterministic evolution of the wave function. But that doesn't show that there is a contradiction between MWI and the *experience* of free-will. You could as well say that the feeling to time passage is a forceful argument for physical time.

Brent

You can find a talk that he gave on the subject here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnV7zUR9UA I think that Gisin's argument is stunted by the fact that he does not consider the effects of multiple entities having free will and instead only considers a single entity having free will in the MWI picture. His point in the paper that "if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair produce a desired effect, this very same specific interaction with most of the other - equally real according to many-worlds - state of affairs would produce uncontrolled random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to maintain a possible window for free will in the many-worlds view" is correct but the "uncontrolled randomness" is only random because we can only resort to an equiprobable ensemble to do calculations of the effects of the interaction in that context. If we consider multiple observers within the MWI, it seems to me that in order for some measure of coherent communications to obtain between them there must be something like a super-selection rule on the branches of the superpositions such that only those mutually compatible observables are able to form a set of mutually true (in the bivalent Boolean sense) in the sense of relative commutativity of observables on each time-like (not just space-like) hypersurface of a foliation of space-time for those observers. I think that this is something that decoherence is pointing toward. Free will follows from the lack of a priori determinateness of the members of that set of observables. Just as we cannot demonstrate a computation that can compute whether or not a given computation will halt, we can similarly not demonstrate a finite Cauchy hypersurface of initial conditions that can uniquely determine both the order of measurements nor the mutual results of those measurements. Free Will is the freedom to chose the basis of a measurement.
Onward!
Stephen
-----Original Message-----
From: scerir
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:15 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: FREE WILL--is it really free?
Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time?
Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
-Nicolas Gisin
http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3440
Abstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something about all possible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations. Hence Nature is nonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief review of some recent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the existence of free
will is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics.
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