By coincidence, I recently came across the following quote from Roger
Penrose's paper “Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow - A Reply to
Commentaries on Shadows of the Mind”.

Offered without comment.  I just thought it was interesting:

What kind of a theory might it be that determines these choices? Many
people who are unhappy with computationalism would be just as unhappy
with any other type of mathematical scheme for determining them. For
they might argue that it is here that "free will" makes its entry, and
they would be unhappy that their free-will choices could be determined
by any kind of mathematics. My own view would be to wait and see what
kind of non-computable scheme ultimately emerges. Perhaps a
sophisticated enough mathematical scheme will turn out not to be so
incompatible with our (feelings of) free will. However, McCarthy takes
the view that I am "quite confused" about free will, and that my ideas
are "not repairable". I am not really clear about which of my confused
ideas McCarthy is referring to. In Shadows, I did not say much about
the issue of free will, except to raise certain issues. Indeed, I am
not at all sure what my views on the subject actually are. Perhaps
that means that I am confused, but I do not see that these ideas are
remotely well enough defined to be irreparable!


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