Quentin,
good question. My agnostic thinking asks first: can you define death? I
think it is something like "the opposite of life" - begging the question:
how would you define LIFE? \
Our terms are subsets for the figment "physical world" and I would not go
along with the medical definition of death without an adequate term of
'life' pointing to the *end* of which.
I 'think' life is much more than a biologic process - especially restricted
to carbon-based physical constructs (molecules?) and borderlines as e.g.
'cell-membranes' etc.
The closest I came up" death calls for a disintegration of "complexity" (at
least its functional(?) substantial parts) in relations we can characterize
in our biosphere as *LIFE*, notable as exercising Metabolism and Repair
('M&R' after: Robert Rosen).
If life is not a noun, rather a process, the discontinuation of it also may
be a process with different parameters.
John M

On Sat, May 21, 2011 at 7:38 PM, Quentin Anciaux <allco...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Isn't all of this a denial of death ? Is it possible to ascribe a meaning
> to the end of consciousness ?
>
> Quentin
>
> 2011/5/21 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>
>
>> Brent: I mostly agree (if it is of any value...).
>>
>> I am FOR an idea of MWI (maybe not as the 'classic' goes: in my view ALL
>> of them may be potentially different) but appreciate the power of hearsay
>> (absorbed as FACT) - you may include other sensory/mental  domains as well.
>> What I take exception to is the *world building role* of an "assumption
>> of a deterministic evolution of THE(?) wave function. -
>> Of what???
>>
>> John
>>
>> On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 8:39 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>>
>>>  On 5/19/2011 4:31 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>>>
>>>  Hi Scerir and Friends,
>>>
>>>     Thank you for posting this link to N. Gisin’s paper. In it Gisin
>>> makes a very eloquent and forceful argument against MWI based on the
>>> experience of free will.
>>>
>>>
>>> Doesn't seem very forceful to me.  There's a contradiction between the
>>> MWI and free will because the MWI assumes deterministic evolution of the
>>> wave function.  But that doesn't show that there is a contradiction between
>>> MWI and the *experience* of free-will.  You could as well say that the
>>> feeling to time passage is a forceful argument for physical time.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> You can find a talk that he gave on the subject here:
>>> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnV7zUR9UA
>>>
>>>
>>>     I think that Gisin's argument is stunted by the fact that he does not
>>> consider the effects of multiple entities having free will and instead only
>>> considers a single entity having free will in the MWI picture. His point in
>>> the paper that "if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair
>>> produce a desired effect, this very same specific interaction with most of
>>> the other - equally real according to many-worlds - state of affairs would
>>> produce uncontrolled random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to
>>> maintain a possible window for free will in the many-worlds view" is correct
>>> but the "uncontrolled randomness" is only random because we can only resort
>>> to an equiprobable ensemble to do calculations of the effects of the
>>> interaction in that context.
>>>     If we consider multiple observers within the MWI, it seems to me that
>>> in order for some measure of coherent communications to obtain between them
>>> there must be something like a super-selection rule on the branches of the
>>> superpositions such that only those mutually compatible observables are able
>>> to form a set of mutually true (in the bivalent Boolean sense) in the sense
>>> of relative commutativity of observables on each time-like (not just
>>> space-like) hypersurface of a foliation of space-time for those observers. I
>>> think that this is something that decoherence is pointing toward.
>>>
>>>     Free will follows from the lack of a priori determinateness of the
>>> members of that set of observables. Just as we cannot demonstrate a
>>> computation that can compute whether or not a given computation will halt,
>>> we can similarly not demonstrate a finite Cauchy hypersurface of initial
>>> conditions that can uniquely determine both the order of measurements nor
>>> the mutual results of those measurements. Free Will is the freedom to chose
>>> the basis of a measurement.
>>>
>>> Onward!
>>>
>>> Stephen
>>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: scerir
>>> Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:15 AM
>>> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>>> Subject: Re: FREE WILL--is it really free?
>>>
>>> Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time?
>>> Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
>>> -Nicolas Gisin
>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3440
>>> Abstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something
>>> about all
>>> possible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations.
>>> Hence Nature is
>>> nonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief
>>> review of some
>>> recent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the
>>> existence of free
>>> will is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics.
>>>
>>>
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