Brent: I mostly agree (if it is of any value...). I am FOR an idea of MWI (maybe not as the 'classic' goes: in my view ALL of them may be potentially different) but appreciate the power of hearsay (absorbed as FACT) - you may include other sensory/mental domains as well. What I take exception to is the *world building role* of an "assumption of a deterministic evolution of THE(?) wave function. - Of what???
John On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 8:39 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/19/2011 4:31 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: > > Hi Scerir and Friends, > > Thank you for posting this link to N. Gisin’s paper. In it Gisin makes > a very eloquent and forceful argument against MWI based on the experience of > free will. > > > Doesn't seem very forceful to me. There's a contradiction between the MWI > and free will because the MWI assumes deterministic evolution of the wave > function. But that doesn't show that there is a contradiction between MWI > and the *experience* of free-will. You could as well say that the feeling > to time passage is a forceful argument for physical time. > > Brent > > > > You can find a talk that he gave on the subject here: > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnV7zUR9UA > > > I think that Gisin's argument is stunted by the fact that he does not > consider the effects of multiple entities having free will and instead only > considers a single entity having free will in the MWI picture. His point in > the paper that "if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair > produce a desired effect, this very same specific interaction with most of > the other - equally real according to many-worlds - state of affairs would > produce uncontrolled random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to > maintain a possible window for free will in the many-worlds view" is correct > but the "uncontrolled randomness" is only random because we can only resort > to an equiprobable ensemble to do calculations of the effects of the > interaction in that context. > If we consider multiple observers within the MWI, it seems to me that > in order for some measure of coherent communications to obtain between them > there must be something like a super-selection rule on the branches of the > superpositions such that only those mutually compatible observables are able > to form a set of mutually true (in the bivalent Boolean sense) in the sense > of relative commutativity of observables on each time-like (not just > space-like) hypersurface of a foliation of space-time for those observers. I > think that this is something that decoherence is pointing toward. > > Free will follows from the lack of a priori determinateness of the > members of that set of observables. Just as we cannot demonstrate a > computation that can compute whether or not a given computation will halt, > we can similarly not demonstrate a finite Cauchy hypersurface of initial > conditions that can uniquely determine both the order of measurements nor > the mutual results of those measurements. Free Will is the freedom to chose > the basis of a measurement. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > -----Original Message----- > From: scerir > Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:15 AM > To: [email protected] > Subject: Re: FREE WILL--is it really free? > > Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time? > Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds" > -Nicolas Gisin > http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3440 > Abstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something > about all > possible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations. > Hence Nature is > nonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief > review of some > recent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the > existence of free > will is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
