Brent: I mostly agree (if it is of any value...).

I am FOR an idea of MWI (maybe not as the 'classic' goes: in my view ALL of
them may be potentially different) but appreciate the power of hearsay
(absorbed as FACT) - you may include other sensory/mental  domains as well.
What I take exception to is the *world building role* of an "assumption of a
deterministic evolution of THE(?) wave function. -
Of what???

John

On Thu, May 19, 2011 at 8:39 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 5/19/2011 4:31 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote:
>
>  Hi Scerir and Friends,
>
>     Thank you for posting this link to N. Gisin’s paper. In it Gisin makes
> a very eloquent and forceful argument against MWI based on the experience of
> free will.
>
>
> Doesn't seem very forceful to me.  There's a contradiction between the MWI
> and free will because the MWI assumes deterministic evolution of the wave
> function.  But that doesn't show that there is a contradiction between MWI
> and the *experience* of free-will.  You could as well say that the feeling
> to time passage is a forceful argument for physical time.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
> You can find a talk that he gave on the subject here:
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9WnV7zUR9UA
>
>
>     I think that Gisin's argument is stunted by the fact that he does not
> consider the effects of multiple entities having free will and instead only
> considers a single entity having free will in the MWI picture. His point in
> the paper that "if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair
> produce a desired effect, this very same specific interaction with most of
> the other - equally real according to many-worlds - state of affairs would
> produce uncontrolled random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to
> maintain a possible window for free will in the many-worlds view" is correct
> but the "uncontrolled randomness" is only random because we can only resort
> to an equiprobable ensemble to do calculations of the effects of the
> interaction in that context.
>     If we consider multiple observers within the MWI, it seems to me that
> in order for some measure of coherent communications to obtain between them
> there must be something like a super-selection rule on the branches of the
> superpositions such that only those mutually compatible observables are able
> to form a set of mutually true (in the bivalent Boolean sense) in the sense
> of relative commutativity of observables on each time-like (not just
> space-like) hypersurface of a foliation of space-time for those observers. I
> think that this is something that decoherence is pointing toward.
>
>     Free will follows from the lack of a priori determinateness of the
> members of that set of observables. Just as we cannot demonstrate a
> computation that can compute whether or not a given computation will halt,
> we can similarly not demonstrate a finite Cauchy hypersurface of initial
> conditions that can uniquely determine both the order of measurements nor
> the mutual results of those measurements. Free Will is the freedom to chose
> the basis of a measurement.
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: scerir
> Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 2:15 AM
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Subject: Re: FREE WILL--is it really free?
>
> Are There Quantum Effects Coming from Outside Space-time?
> Nonlocality, free will and "no many-worlds"
> -Nicolas Gisin
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1011.3440
> Abstract: Observing the violation of Bell's inequality tells us something
> about all
> possible future theories: they must all predict nonlocal correlations.
> Hence Nature is
> nonlocal. After an elementary introduction to nonlocality and a brief
> review of some
> recent experiments, I argue that Nature's nonlocality together with the
> existence of free
> will is incompatible with the many-worlds view of quantum physics.
>
>
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