On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following:
On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<[email protected]>
...
The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical truth is
essentially just the same as assuming there is some more
comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and Mlodinow
recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set of
theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent
theory.
Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view,
this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of
the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until
some observer will start researching them.
Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for
arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in
physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams'
don't glue well enough.
But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of
comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the dreams
glue pretty well, I would say.
I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental
reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set
of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as
comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate precisely.
The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates
perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle.
Bruno
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