Hi Stephen,
On 28 Jun 2011, at 22:04, Stephen Paul King wrote:
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2011 3:47 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 28 Jun 2011, at 18:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2011 12:38 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<[email protected]>
>
> ...
>
>>
>> The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical
truth is
>> essentially just the same as assuming there is some more
>> comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and
Mlodinow
>> recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set
of
>> theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent
>> theory.
>
> Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view,
> this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of
> the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until
> some observer will start researching them.
Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for
arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in
physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams'
don't glue well enough.
But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of
comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the
dreams
glue pretty well, I would say.
I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental
reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set
of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as
comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate
precisely.
The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates
perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle.
Bruno
***
Dear Friends,
If I may. A review of the Hawking and Mlodinov book can be
found here: http://physicsbuzz.physicscentral.com/2010/09/hawking-mlodinow-no-theory-of_30.html
While I can only speculate about gluing dreams together, I would
like to see more detail of “an inadequacy of the metaphysics of
Aristotle”. As a student of philosophy I am interested in such
arguments.
So what do you think about the UD Argument?
It shows precisely that IF we are digital machine at SOME level,
then, roughly speaking, Plato and the mystics have the correct
conception of reality and Aristotle has the wrong one. It might seem
amazing, but then, I am just reformulating the mind body problem in
computer science, using the mechanist *hypothesis*. Yet it is
constructive, and for each "theory of knowledge" you propose, you
get its corresponding physics. I illustrate this on the classical
theory of knowledge (Theaetetus, Plotinus) with believability
'model" by formal provability (AUDA).
UDA is a reasoning which shows that "being a machine" makes
Aristotle wrong. It assumes that consciousness is invariant for a
digital substitution at some level of description, and it concludes
that the consciousness/reality coupling *have to* emerge from the
internal views of the many universal numbers. Neither mind nor
matter is arithmetical, but they are natural internal modalities of
the arithmetical.
Stephen, do you accept that your daughter marry a digital machine?
(For example, a human who did already say "yes" to the doctor).
Would you say "yes" to a doctor who proposes to you a digital
artificial brain?
Would you take an Apple or a Microsoft? :)
You have to grasp UDA, or find a flaw. AUDA is only UDA for the
'dummies', I mean UDA for the universal Löbian machines, accepting
the classical theory of knowledge. It already shows that the
observable are not boolean, and are close to the quantum.
Universal numbers have a rich theology which provide an explanation
of the quanta and the qualia. Those theologies are testable by
comparing the explanation of the quanta by the universal machine
with the empiric facts.
I am afraid you have not study sane04, or I miss something.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
Hi Bruno,
I like the UD idea. A lot!
Well thanks. But it is not a question of liking the UD, but of
grasping the UDA. If you are not yet convinced I am interested to know
at which step of the reasoning you have a problem. (in the sane04
there is 8 steps, but the eighth step better presentation has been
done in this list under the name MGA).
Ah, ok. I think that those two, Plato and Aristotle, where just
looking at different sides of the same n-sided Dice. No finite
theory can ever more than just approximate the totality of
Existence. We just keep figuring out better ways of explaining
things...
It depends of which theory you are using. If we are digital machine,
one is correct (Plato) and the other one is wrong (Aristotle). It is
as simple as that. Please study the argument. It is a bit important
given that the Aristotelian theology is the usual paradigm, except
among greeks intellectuals during the -500 to 523 period.
I found a cartoon explanation of Lob’s Theorem yesterday that I
thought I would pass along:
http://yudkowsky.net/assets/pdf/LobsTheorem.pdf
It is full of inadequacies. It confuses mathematical induction and
inductive inference. It confuse Gödel's theorem and Tarski theorem,
and it makes the proof of Löb looking more difficult than it really
is, at least if you know Gödel's diagonalization lemma. The cartoon
idea is cute , though. A good book on this is Smullyan's book "Forever
Undecided" (which contains inaccuracies only in some philosophical
remark, and this assuming comp, which Smullyan does not).
What I am really interested is where we have lots and lots of
PAs communicating with each other. (Peano Arithmatic is the
character in Yudkowsky’s story).... I got to get back to learning
some more math. I need to write a paper. Have fun!
For UDA you don't need math. Only a passive understanding of what a
'universal machine is'. For AUDA, you need familiarity with
provability and modal logics.
Have a nice day,
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
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