Hi Bruno,

    In response to your comments and questions below could I ask that you take 
a look at http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~sjv/PSSL91Slides.pdf and see if the ideas 
therein are compatible with yours.

Onward!

Stephen


From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2011 1:35 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
Hi Stephen, 


On 28 Jun 2011, at 22:04, Stephen Paul King wrote:


  From: Bruno Marchal 
  Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2011 3:47 PM
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

  On 28 Jun 2011, at 18:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:



    -----Original Message----- 
    From: Bruno Marchal 
    Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2011 12:38 PM 
    To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
    Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out 


    On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:

    > On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following:
    >> On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
    >>> On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<marc...@ulb.ac.be>
    >
    > ...
    >
    >>
    >> The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical truth is
    >> essentially just the same as assuming there is some more
    >> comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and Mlodinow
    >> recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set of
    >> theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent
    >> theory.
    >
    > Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view,  
    > this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of  
    > the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until  
    > some observer will start researching them.

    Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for  
    arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in  
    physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams'  
    don't glue well enough.
    But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of  
    comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the dreams  
    glue pretty well, I would say.
      I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental  
    reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set  
    of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as  
    comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate precisely.
    The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates  
    perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle.

    Bruno
    ***

    Dear Friends,
        If I may. A review of the Hawking and Mlodinov  book can be found here: 
http://physicsbuzz.physicscentral.com/2010/09/hawking-mlodinow-no-theory-of_30.html
    While I can only speculate about gluing dreams together, I would like to 
see more detail of “an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle”. As a 
student of philosophy I am interested in such arguments.

  So what do you think about the UD Argument? 

  It shows precisely that IF we are digital machine at SOME level, then, 
roughly speaking, Plato and the mystics have the correct conception of reality 
and Aristotle has the wrong one. It might seem amazing, but then, I am just 
reformulating the mind body problem in computer science, using the mechanist 
*hypothesis*. Yet it is constructive, and for each "theory of knowledge" you 
propose, you get its corresponding physics. I illustrate this on the classical 
theory of knowledge (Theaetetus, Plotinus) with believability 'model" by formal 
provability (AUDA).

  UDA is a reasoning which shows that "being a machine" makes Aristotle wrong. 
It assumes that consciousness is invariant for a digital substitution at some 
level of description, and it concludes that the consciousness/reality coupling 
*have to* emerge from the internal views of the many universal numbers. Neither 
mind nor matter is arithmetical, but they are natural internal modalities of 
the arithmetical. 

  Stephen, do you accept that your daughter marry a digital machine? (For 
example, a human who did already say "yes" to the doctor). Would you say "yes" 
to a doctor who proposes to you a digital artificial brain? 
  Would you take an Apple or a Microsoft? :)

  You have to grasp UDA, or find a flaw. AUDA is only UDA for the 'dummies', I 
mean UDA for the universal Löbian machines, accepting the classical theory of 
knowledge. It already shows that the observable are not boolean, and are close 
to the quantum. 

  Universal numbers have a rich theology which provide an explanation of the 
quanta and the qualia. Those theologies are testable by comparing the 
explanation of the quanta by the universal machine with the empiric facts.

  I am afraid you have not study sane04, or I miss something.          

  Bruno

  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

   

  -- 

   
  Hi Bruno,

      I like the UD idea. A lot!


Well thanks. But it is not a question of liking the UD, but of grasping the 
UDA. If you are not yet convinced I am interested to know at which step of the 
reasoning you have a problem. (in the sane04 there is 8 steps, but the eighth 
step better presentation has been done in this list under the name MGA). 






      Ah, ok. I think that those two, Plato and Aristotle, where just looking 
at different sides of the same n-sided Dice. No finite theory can ever more 
than just approximate the totality of Existence. We just keep figuring out 
better ways of explaining things... 


It depends of which theory you are using. If we are digital machine, one is 
correct (Plato) and the other one is wrong (Aristotle). It is as simple as 
that. Please study the argument. It is a bit important given that the 
Aristotelian theology is the usual paradigm, except among greeks intellectuals 
during the -500 to 523 period.





  I found a cartoon explanation of Lob’s Theorem yesterday that I thought I 
would pass along:

  http://yudkowsky.net/assets/pdf/LobsTheorem.pdf


It is full of inadequacies. It confuses mathematical induction and inductive 
inference. It confuse Gödel's theorem and Tarski theorem, and it makes the 
proof of Löb looking more difficult than it really is, at least if you know 
Gödel's diagonalization lemma. The cartoon idea is cute , though. A good book 
on this is Smullyan's book "Forever Undecided" (which contains inaccuracies 
only in some philosophical remark, and this assuming comp, which Smullyan does 
not).





      What I am really interested is where we have lots and lots of PAs 
communicating with each other. (Peano Arithmatic is the character in 
Yudkowsky’s story).... I got to get back to learning some more math. I need to 
write a paper. Have fun!


For UDA you don't need math. Only a passive understanding of what a 'universal 
machine is'. For AUDA, you need familiarity with provability and modal logics.

Have a nice day,

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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