On 28 Jun 2011, at 18:49, Stephen Paul King wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2011 12:38 PM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out
On 27 Jun 2011, at 21:51, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
> On 26.06.2011 22:33 meekerdb said the following:
>> On 6/26/2011 12:58 PM, Rex Allen wrote:
>>> On Fri, Jun 24, 2011 at 1:05 PM, Bruno Marchal<[email protected]>
>
> ...
>
>>
>> The idea that our theories are approaching some metaphysical
truth is
>> essentially just the same as assuming there is some more
>> comprehensive and coherent theory. I note that Hawking and Mlodinow
>> recently suggested that we might accept a kind of patch-work set of
>> theories of the world, rather than insisting on a single coherent
>> theory.
>
> Could you please give references to such a statement? In my view,
> this is exactly the way to implement efficiently some simulation of
> the world. It is unnecessary for example to simulate atoms until
> some observer will start researching them.
Ah ah, ... but so you can guess that it would be more easy for
arithmetic too, in that case. That (a need for patch-work theories in
physics) could happen if the partially sharable numbers' 'dreams'
don't glue well enough.
But we don't know that. It is 'just' an open problem in the frame of
comp. Arithmetical evidences and empirical evidence is that the dreams
glue pretty well, I would say.
I think Hawking and Mlodinov are assuming that the fundamental
reality is physical. The fact that the physical needs patch-work set
of theories does not entail that the big picture needs that too, as
comp (uda) and "formal arithmetical comp" (auda) illustrate precisely.
The fact that physicists can arrive to such extremities illustrates
perhaps an inadequacy of the metaphysics of Aristotle.
Bruno
***
Dear Friends,
If I may. A review of the Hawking and Mlodinov book can be
found here: http://physicsbuzz.physicscentral.com/2010/09/hawking-mlodinow-no-theory-of_30.html
While I can only speculate about gluing dreams together, I would
like to see more detail of “an inadequacy of the metaphysics of
Aristotle”. As a student of philosophy I am interested in such
arguments.
So what do you think about the UD Argument?
It shows precisely that IF we are digital machine at SOME level, then,
roughly speaking, Plato and the mystics have the correct conception of
reality and Aristotle has the wrong one. It might seem amazing, but
then, I am just reformulating the mind body problem in computer
science, using the mechanist *hypothesis*. Yet it is constructive, and
for each "theory of knowledge" you propose, you get its corresponding
physics. I illustrate this on the classical theory of knowledge
(Theaetetus, Plotinus) with believability 'model" by formal
provability (AUDA).
UDA is a reasoning which shows that "being a machine" makes Aristotle
wrong. It assumes that consciousness is invariant for a digital
substitution at some level of description, and it concludes that the
consciousness/reality coupling *have to* emerge from the internal
views of the many universal numbers. Neither mind nor matter is
arithmetical, but they are natural internal modalities of the
arithmetical.
Stephen, do you accept that your daughter marry a digital machine?
(For example, a human who did already say "yes" to the doctor). Would
you say "yes" to a doctor who proposes to you a digital artificial
brain?
Would you take an Apple or a Microsoft? :)
You have to grasp UDA, or find a flaw. AUDA is only UDA for the
'dummies', I mean UDA for the universal Löbian machines, accepting the
classical theory of knowledge. It already shows that the observable
are not boolean, and are close to the quantum.
Universal numbers have a rich theology which provide an explanation of
the quanta and the qualia. Those theologies are testable by comparing
the explanation of the quanta by the universal machine with the
empiric facts.
I am afraid you have not study sane04, or I miss something.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
