How can we have a truth about a reality we can't relate to.... and how can
there be a reality that is "higher" or more fundamental then us but not more
conscious and intelligent and powerful then us?

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:41 PM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Bruno, can I understand you as saying that the world as we experience it,
> isn't primary, but that there is some non-experimental truth that is
> conceptually reflected in our experience and accounts for the primary
> reality of the world? You want to reject the primacy of corporeal and
> sensorial experience for some independently existing and non-experiential
> matrix?
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 1:12 PM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> "If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought,
>> show us the dependence."
>>
>> We must be confused, or I must be confused.... because you are way to
>> clever to not get what seems so simple and straightforward to me.... so
>> there must be some kind of confusion....
>>
>> because I would respond to this by saying: the dependence is, if there was
>> no human thought, there would be no such statement.
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On 04 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>>>
>>>  "it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
>>>> numbers. "
>>>>
>>>> how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of
>>>> human thought?
>>>>
>>>
>>> I assume Robinson arithmetic, like all scientists. Nothing less, and
>>> surpringly (that is the result) we cannot need anything more, once we take
>>> the mechanist hypothesis seriously enough (like when saying "yes" to a
>>> digitalist surgeon).
>>>
>>> If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought,
>>> show us the dependence.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination,
>>>> thought, and figures?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. They are usually conceive in that way.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism,
>>>>>> which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you
>>>>>> already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical)
>>>>>> platonia.
>>>>>> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal
>>>>>> dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary
>>>>>> arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of
>>>>>> everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including
>>>>>> their incommunicability.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which
>>>>>> is more accurately described as subjective idealism:
>>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.**org/wiki/Immaterialism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism>
>>>>>> I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article.
>>>>> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non-
>>>>> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the
>>>>> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either
>>>>> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist
>>>>> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and
>>>>> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually
>>>>> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind).
>>>>> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to
>>>>> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in
>>>>> angels and fairy tales.
>>>>> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is
>>>>> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the
>>>>> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something
>>>>> behind our observations.
>>>>> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or
>>>>> physics was the fundamental science.
>>>>>
>>>>> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where
>>>>> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide
>>>>> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to
>>>>> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which
>>>>> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of
>>>>> reality makes only a  re-apparition in discussion through the quantum
>>>>> weirdness.
>>>>>
>>>>> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of
>>>>> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear
>>>>> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a
>>>>> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
>>>>> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence
>>>>> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those
>>>>> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the
>>>>> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise
>>>>> (mathematical) questions.
>>>>>
>>>>> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected
>>>>> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer
>>>>> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of
>>>>> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1
>>>>> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and
>>>>> aristotelian) view on immaterialism.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>  I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that
>>>>>> this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but
>>>>>> solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all
>>>>>> numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges
>>>>>> from gluing properties of those dreams/computations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  You are right, I should find a less general term.  It is the missing
>>>>>> of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp
>>>>>> from the immaterialism of Berkeley.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always
>>>>> decide on vocabulary issue later.
>>>>>
>>>>> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing
>>>>> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers
>>>>> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least
>>>>> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what
>>>>> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter
>>>>> the subject than the old naturalists.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by
>>>>> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that
>>>>> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with
>>>>> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and
>>>>> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those
>>>>> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or
>>>>> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if
>>>>> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of
>>>>> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization,
>>>>> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give
>>>>> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on
>>>>> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is
>>>>> there at the start:  G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the
>>>>> false).
>>>>>
>>>>> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more
>>>>> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet
>>>>> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from
>>>>> the numbers self-observations.
>>>>> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem
>>>>> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic.
>>>>> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness),
>>>>> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are
>>>>> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta
>>>>> from the qualia, and to relate the two.
>>>>>
>>>>> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you
>>>>> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or
>>>>> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long,
>>>>> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high
>>>>> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has
>>>>> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are
>>>>> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to
>>>>> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified
>>>>> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of
>>>>> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the
>>>>> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers
>>>>> which might be great of course(*)).
>>>>>
>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>
>>>>> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you
>>>>> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable
>>>>> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch'
>>>>> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and
>>>>> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables.
>>>>> Unknowns range on the non negative integers.
>>>>> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique
>>>>> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60).
>>>>>
>>>>> X is in W_Nu iff
>>>>>
>>>>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y
>>>>>
>>>>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2
>>>>>
>>>>> Qu = B^(5^60)
>>>>>
>>>>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5
>>>>>
>>>>> Th +  2Z = B^5
>>>>>
>>>>> L = U + TTh
>>>>>
>>>>> E = Y + MTh
>>>>>
>>>>> N = Q^16
>>>>>
>>>>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +
>>>>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
>>>>>          + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)
>>>>>
>>>>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2
>>>>>
>>>>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2
>>>>>
>>>>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2
>>>>>
>>>>> K = R + 1 + HP - H
>>>>>
>>>>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2
>>>>>
>>>>> C = 2R + 1 Ph
>>>>>
>>>>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga
>>>>>
>>>>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1
>>>>>
>>>>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1
>>>>>
>>>>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  If by representation you mean the representation of
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> consciousness, then this
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>  Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>  I say the opposite.  Representation is something you do, which is so
>>>>>>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the
>>>>>>> explanation for everything.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>  You should read thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Functionalism_(**
>>>>>>> philosophy_of_mind)<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>  Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what
>>>>>>> they are that is important in a mind.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>  Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes
>>>>>>> the functions are Turing emulable)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>  I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy
>>>>>> form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects).
>>>>>> It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we
>>>>>> cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you
>>>>>> need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense
>>>>>> functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because
>>>>>> functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are
>>>>>> just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the
>>>>>> tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical
>>>>>> computer scientists.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation,
>>>>>> from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the
>>>>>> (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a
>>>>>> representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>  In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine,
>>>>>> then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view".
>>>>>> He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course,
>>>>>> once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature"
>>>>>> has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively
>>>>>> to chemistry, and given the
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>> read more »
>>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>
>

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