How can we have a truth about a reality we can't relate to.... and how can there be a reality that is "higher" or more fundamental then us but not more conscious and intelligent and powerful then us?
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:41 PM, B Soroud <[email protected]> wrote: > Bruno, can I understand you as saying that the world as we experience it, > isn't primary, but that there is some non-experimental truth that is > conceptually reflected in our experience and accounts for the primary > reality of the world? You want to reject the primacy of corporeal and > sensorial experience for some independently existing and non-experiential > matrix? > > > On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 1:12 PM, B Soroud <[email protected]> wrote: > >> "If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, >> show us the dependence." >> >> We must be confused, or I must be confused.... because you are way to >> clever to not get what seems so simple and straightforward to me.... so >> there must be some kind of confusion.... >> >> because I would respond to this by saying: the dependence is, if there was >> no human thought, there would be no such statement. >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 04 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: >>> >>> "it emerges from self-observation by relative universal >>>> numbers. " >>>> >>>> how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of >>>> human thought? >>>> >>> >>> I assume Robinson arithmetic, like all scientists. Nothing less, and >>> surpringly (that is the result) we cannot need anything more, once we take >>> the mechanist hypothesis seriously enough (like when saying "yes" to a >>> digitalist surgeon). >>> >>> If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, >>> show us the dependence. >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination, >>>> thought, and figures? >>>> >>> >>> Yes. They are usually conceive in that way. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, >>>>>> which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you >>>>>> already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) >>>>>> platonia. >>>>>> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal >>>>>> dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary >>>>>> arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of >>>>>> everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including >>>>>> their incommunicability. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which >>>>>> is more accurately described as subjective idealism: >>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.**org/wiki/Immaterialism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism> >>>>>> I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article. >>>>> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non- >>>>> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the >>>>> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either >>>>> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist >>>>> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and >>>>> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually >>>>> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind). >>>>> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to >>>>> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in >>>>> angels and fairy tales. >>>>> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is >>>>> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the >>>>> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something >>>>> behind our observations. >>>>> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or >>>>> physics was the fundamental science. >>>>> >>>>> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where >>>>> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide >>>>> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to >>>>> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which >>>>> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of >>>>> reality makes only a re-apparition in discussion through the quantum >>>>> weirdness. >>>>> >>>>> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of >>>>> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear >>>>> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a >>>>> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal >>>>> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence >>>>> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those >>>>> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the >>>>> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise >>>>> (mathematical) questions. >>>>> >>>>> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected >>>>> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer >>>>> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of >>>>> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1 >>>>> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and >>>>> aristotelian) view on immaterialism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that >>>>>> this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but >>>>>> solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all >>>>>> numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges >>>>>> from gluing properties of those dreams/computations. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You are right, I should find a less general term. It is the missing >>>>>> of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp >>>>>> from the immaterialism of Berkeley. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always >>>>> decide on vocabulary issue later. >>>>> >>>>> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing >>>>> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers >>>>> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least >>>>> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what >>>>> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter >>>>> the subject than the old naturalists. >>>>> >>>>> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by >>>>> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that >>>>> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with >>>>> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and >>>>> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those >>>>> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or >>>>> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if >>>>> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of >>>>> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization, >>>>> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give >>>>> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on >>>>> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is >>>>> there at the start: G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the >>>>> false). >>>>> >>>>> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more >>>>> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet >>>>> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from >>>>> the numbers self-observations. >>>>> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem >>>>> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic. >>>>> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness), >>>>> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are >>>>> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta >>>>> from the qualia, and to relate the two. >>>>> >>>>> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you >>>>> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or >>>>> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long, >>>>> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high >>>>> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has >>>>> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are >>>>> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to >>>>> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified >>>>> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of >>>>> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the >>>>> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers >>>>> which might be great of course(*)). >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you >>>>> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable >>>>> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch' >>>>> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and >>>>> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables. >>>>> Unknowns range on the non negative integers. >>>>> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique >>>>> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60). >>>>> >>>>> X is in W_Nu iff >>>>> >>>>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y >>>>> >>>>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2 >>>>> >>>>> Qu = B^(5^60) >>>>> >>>>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5 >>>>> >>>>> Th + 2Z = B^5 >>>>> >>>>> L = U + TTh >>>>> >>>>> E = Y + MTh >>>>> >>>>> N = Q^16 >>>>> >>>>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + >>>>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N) >>>>> + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1) >>>>> >>>>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2 >>>>> >>>>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2 >>>>> >>>>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2 >>>>> >>>>> K = R + 1 + HP - H >>>>> >>>>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2 >>>>> >>>>> C = 2R + 1 Ph >>>>> >>>>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga >>>>> >>>>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1 >>>>> >>>>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1 >>>>> >>>>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If by representation you mean the representation of >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> consciousness, then this >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> I say the opposite. Representation is something you do, which is so >>>>>>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the >>>>>>> explanation for everything. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> You should read thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Functionalism_(** >>>>>>> philosophy_of_mind)<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29> >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what >>>>>>> they are that is important in a mind. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes >>>>>>> the functions are Turing emulable) >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>> I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy >>>>>> form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). >>>>>> It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we >>>>>> cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you >>>>>> need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense >>>>>> functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because >>>>>> functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are >>>>>> just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the >>>>>> tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical >>>>>> computer scientists. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, >>>>>> from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the >>>>>> (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a >>>>>> representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, >>>>>> then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". >>>>>> He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, >>>>>> once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" >>>>>> has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively >>>>>> to chemistry, and given the >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> >>>>> read more » >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to >>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>> . >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>> . >>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> >>> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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