We are god, and outside the normal physical world of interacting relations... there is no truth or being. All metaphysics is fiction.... Human-created.... for there is no other being! We are the highest! We are making everything up!
On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:48 PM, B Soroud <[email protected]> wrote: > How can we have a truth about a reality we can't relate to.... and how can > there be a reality that is "higher" or more fundamental then us but not more > conscious and intelligent and powerful then us? > > > On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:41 PM, B Soroud <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Bruno, can I understand you as saying that the world as we experience it, >> isn't primary, but that there is some non-experimental truth that is >> conceptually reflected in our experience and accounts for the primary >> reality of the world? You want to reject the primacy of corporeal and >> sensorial experience for some independently existing and non-experiential >> matrix? >> >> >> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 1:12 PM, B Soroud <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> "If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, >>> show us the dependence." >>> >>> We must be confused, or I must be confused.... because you are way to >>> clever to not get what seems so simple and straightforward to me.... so >>> there must be some kind of confusion.... >>> >>> because I would respond to this by saying: the dependence is, if there >>> was no human thought, there would be no such statement. >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 04 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote: >>>> >>>> "it emerges from self-observation by relative universal >>>>> numbers. " >>>>> >>>>> how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of >>>>> human thought? >>>>> >>>> >>>> I assume Robinson arithmetic, like all scientists. Nothing less, and >>>> surpringly (that is the result) we cannot need anything more, once we take >>>> the mechanist hypothesis seriously enough (like when saying "yes" to a >>>> digitalist surgeon). >>>> >>>> If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought, >>>> show us the dependence. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination, >>>>> thought, and figures? >>>>> >>>> >>>> Yes. They are usually conceive in that way. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, >>>>>>> which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you >>>>>>> already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) >>>>>>> platonia. >>>>>>> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal >>>>>>> dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary >>>>>>> arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of >>>>>>> everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including >>>>>>> their incommunicability. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which >>>>>>> is more accurately described as subjective idealism: >>>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.**org/wiki/Immaterialism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism> >>>>>>> I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article. >>>>>> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non- >>>>>> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the >>>>>> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either >>>>>> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist >>>>>> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and >>>>>> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually >>>>>> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth >>>>>> behind). >>>>>> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to >>>>>> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in >>>>>> angels and fairy tales. >>>>>> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is >>>>>> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the >>>>>> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something >>>>>> behind our observations. >>>>>> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or >>>>>> physics was the fundamental science. >>>>>> >>>>>> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where >>>>>> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide >>>>>> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to >>>>>> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which >>>>>> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of >>>>>> reality makes only a re-apparition in discussion through the quantum >>>>>> weirdness. >>>>>> >>>>>> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of >>>>>> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear >>>>>> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a >>>>>> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal >>>>>> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence >>>>>> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those >>>>>> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the >>>>>> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise >>>>>> (mathematical) questions. >>>>>> >>>>>> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected >>>>>> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer >>>>>> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of >>>>>> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1 >>>>>> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and >>>>>> aristotelian) view on immaterialism. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that >>>>>>> this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but >>>>>>> solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all >>>>>>> numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges >>>>>>> from gluing properties of those dreams/computations. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> You are right, I should find a less general term. It is the missing >>>>>>> of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp >>>>>>> from the immaterialism of Berkeley. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always >>>>>> decide on vocabulary issue later. >>>>>> >>>>>> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing >>>>>> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers >>>>>> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least >>>>>> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what >>>>>> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter >>>>>> the subject than the old naturalists. >>>>>> >>>>>> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by >>>>>> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that >>>>>> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with >>>>>> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and >>>>>> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those >>>>>> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or >>>>>> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if >>>>>> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of >>>>>> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization, >>>>>> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give >>>>>> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on >>>>>> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is >>>>>> there at the start: G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the >>>>>> false). >>>>>> >>>>>> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more >>>>>> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet >>>>>> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from >>>>>> the numbers self-observations. >>>>>> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem >>>>>> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic. >>>>>> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness), >>>>>> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are >>>>>> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta >>>>>> from the qualia, and to relate the two. >>>>>> >>>>>> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you >>>>>> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or >>>>>> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long, >>>>>> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high >>>>>> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has >>>>>> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are >>>>>> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to >>>>>> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified >>>>>> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of >>>>>> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the >>>>>> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers >>>>>> which might be great of course(*)). >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you >>>>>> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable >>>>>> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch' >>>>>> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and >>>>>> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables. >>>>>> Unknowns range on the non negative integers. >>>>>> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique >>>>>> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60). >>>>>> >>>>>> X is in W_Nu iff >>>>>> >>>>>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y >>>>>> >>>>>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2 >>>>>> >>>>>> Qu = B^(5^60) >>>>>> >>>>>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5 >>>>>> >>>>>> Th + 2Z = B^5 >>>>>> >>>>>> L = U + TTh >>>>>> >>>>>> E = Y + MTh >>>>>> >>>>>> N = Q^16 >>>>>> >>>>>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + >>>>>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N) >>>>>> + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1) >>>>>> >>>>>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2 >>>>>> >>>>>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2 >>>>>> >>>>>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2 >>>>>> >>>>>> K = R + 1 + HP - H >>>>>> >>>>>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2 >>>>>> >>>>>> C = 2R + 1 Ph >>>>>> >>>>>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga >>>>>> >>>>>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1 >>>>>> >>>>>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1 >>>>>> >>>>>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1 >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> If by representation you mean the representation of >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> consciousness, then this >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> I say the opposite. Representation is something you do, which is so >>>>>>>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the >>>>>>>> explanation for everything. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> You should read thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Functionalism_(** >>>>>>>> philosophy_of_mind)<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what >>>>>>>> they are that is important in a mind. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes >>>>>>>> the functions are Turing emulable) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy >>>>>>> form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). >>>>>>> It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we >>>>>>> cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you >>>>>>> need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense >>>>>>> functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because >>>>>>> functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are >>>>>>> just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the >>>>>>> tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical >>>>>>> computer scientists. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, >>>>>>> from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the >>>>>>> (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a >>>>>>> representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, >>>>>>> then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". >>>>>>> He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, >>>>>>> once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" >>>>>>> has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively >>>>>>> to chemistry, and given the >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> ... >>>>>> >>>>>> read more » >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.** >>>>> com <[email protected]>. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to >>>> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >>>> . >>>> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>> . >>>> >>>> >>> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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