We are god, and outside the normal physical world of interacting
relations... there is no truth or being. All metaphysics is fiction....
Human-created.... for there is no other being! We are the highest! We are
making everything up!

On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:48 PM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:

> How can we have a truth about a reality we can't relate to.... and how can
> there be a reality that is "higher" or more fundamental then us but not more
> conscious and intelligent and powerful then us?
>
>
> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 6:41 PM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Bruno, can I understand you as saying that the world as we experience it,
>> isn't primary, but that there is some non-experimental truth that is
>> conceptually reflected in our experience and accounts for the primary
>> reality of the world? You want to reject the primacy of corporeal and
>> sensorial experience for some independently existing and non-experiential
>> matrix?
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 1:12 PM, B Soroud <bsor...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> "If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought,
>>> show us the dependence."
>>>
>>> We must be confused, or I must be confused.... because you are way to
>>> clever to not get what seems so simple and straightforward to me.... so
>>> there must be some kind of confusion....
>>>
>>> because I would respond to this by saying: the dependence is, if there
>>> was no human thought, there would be no such statement.
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jul 5, 2011 at 2:34 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 04 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Constantine Pseudonymous wrote:
>>>>
>>>>  "it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
>>>>> numbers. "
>>>>>
>>>>> how could you ever prove that there are any "numbers" independent of
>>>>> human thought?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I assume Robinson arithmetic, like all scientists. Nothing less, and
>>>> surpringly (that is the result) we cannot need anything more, once we take
>>>> the mechanist hypothesis seriously enough (like when saying "yes" to a
>>>> digitalist surgeon).
>>>>
>>>> If you believe that a statement like Ex(x=x) depends on human thought,
>>>> show us the dependence.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> are there any numbers independent of language, sound, imagination,
>>>>> thought, and figures?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes. They are usually conceive in that way.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> On Jun 7, 9:31 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism,
>>>>>>> which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you
>>>>>>> already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical)
>>>>>>> platonia.
>>>>>>> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal
>>>>>>> dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary
>>>>>>> arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of
>>>>>>> everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including
>>>>>>> their incommunicability.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which
>>>>>>> is more accurately described as subjective idealism:
>>>>>>> http://en.wikipedia.**org/wiki/Immaterialism<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism>
>>>>>>> I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article.
>>>>>> It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non-
>>>>>> consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the
>>>>>> Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either
>>>>>> mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist
>>>>>> will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and
>>>>>> like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually
>>>>>> approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth
>>>>>> behind).
>>>>>> The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to
>>>>>> solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in
>>>>>> angels and fairy tales.
>>>>>> But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is
>>>>>> before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the
>>>>>> primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something
>>>>>> behind our observations.
>>>>>> The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or
>>>>>> physics was the fundamental science.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where
>>>>>> the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide
>>>>>> that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to
>>>>>> measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which
>>>>>> is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of
>>>>>> reality makes only a  re-apparition in discussion through the quantum
>>>>>> weirdness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of
>>>>>> ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear
>>>>>> (albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a
>>>>>> modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal
>>>>>> numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence
>>>>>> of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those
>>>>>> Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the
>>>>>> notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise
>>>>>> (mathematical) questions.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected
>>>>>> at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer
>>>>>> science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of
>>>>>> number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1
>>>>>> complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and
>>>>>> aristotelian) view on immaterialism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that
>>>>>>> this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but
>>>>>>> solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all
>>>>>>> numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges
>>>>>>> from gluing properties of those dreams/computations.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  You are right, I should find a less general term.  It is the missing
>>>>>>> of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp
>>>>>>> from the immaterialism of Berkeley.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always
>>>>>> decide on vocabulary issue later.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing
>>>>>> only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers
>>>>>> could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least
>>>>>> before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what
>>>>>> happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter
>>>>>> the subject than the old naturalists.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by
>>>>>> self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that
>>>>>> is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with
>>>>>> you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and
>>>>>> those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those
>>>>>> did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or
>>>>>> the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if
>>>>>> not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of
>>>>>> solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism from diagonalization,
>>>>>> and QM saves comp from solipsism. Formally, incompleteness will give
>>>>>> many possibilities for the glue to form, with the risky one based on
>>>>>> lies (shit happens in Platonia too, that is the bad news, but it is
>>>>>> there at the start:  G* prove DBf (it is consistent to prove the
>>>>>> false).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Comp's message is not "we got the theory of everything". It is more
>>>>>> "Oh, even if physicists unify all laws of nature, the task is NOT yet
>>>>>> finished". Taking comp seriously, we *have to* justify those laws from
>>>>>> the numbers self-observations.
>>>>>> My work translate the classical mind body problem into a body problem
>>>>>> mathematically expressed in computer science and in arithmetic.
>>>>>> Thanks to computer science (insolubilities and incompleteness),
>>>>>> (accepting the classical theory of knowledge), we get a gift: we are
>>>>>> able to separate (in the self-referentially correct way) the quanta
>>>>>> from the qualia, and to relate the two.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When you said that computation are in math, or in arithmetic, are you
>>>>>> aware that this is explicitly proved in (good) textbook in logic or
>>>>>> computer science? This is not easy to show. It is tedious and long,
>>>>>> and there are always subtle points. But it is akin to define a high
>>>>>> level programming language in a low level language. Matiyasevitch has
>>>>>> gone farer than anyone in showing that diophantine polynomials are
>>>>>> already enough (but that is much more complex to prove). This leads to
>>>>>> a crazy proposition, which is that all sigma_1 truth can be verified
>>>>>> in less than 100 operations, that is addition and multiplication of
>>>>>> numbers. It means that all stopping computations can be given in the
>>>>>> form of a short sequence of addition and multiplication (on numbers
>>>>>> which might be great of course(*)).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Bruno
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (*) I can resist to show a version by Jones of that result. If you
>>>>>> remember the RE set W_i, the set analog of partial computable
>>>>>> functions (which are also the domain of the phi_i) Matiyasevitch'
>>>>>> result can take the shape below. Nu and X are the two parameters, and
>>>>>> the other letters, and the two characters "letters" are variables.
>>>>>> Unknowns range on the non negative integers.
>>>>>> By adding enough variable, you could arrive at a degree four unique
>>>>>> polynomial, but here we allow high degree. Look at that B^(5^60).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> X is in W_Nu iff
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Qu = B^(5^60)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Th +  2Z = B^5
>>>>>>
>>>>>> L = U + TTh
>>>>>>
>>>>>> E = Y + MTh
>>>>>>
>>>>>> N = Q^16
>>>>>>
>>>>>> R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + +
>>>>>> LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
>>>>>>          + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> 4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> K = R + 1 + HP - H
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2
>>>>>>
>>>>>> C = 2R + 1 Ph
>>>>>>
>>>>>> D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga
>>>>>>
>>>>>> D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1
>>>>>>
>>>>>> F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  If by representation you mean the representation of
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> consciousness, then this
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  I say the opposite.  Representation is something you do, which is so
>>>>>>>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the
>>>>>>>> explanation for everything.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  You should read thishttp://en.wikipedia.org/**wiki/Functionalism_(**
>>>>>>>> philosophy_of_mind)<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what
>>>>>>>> they are that is important in a mind.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes
>>>>>>>> the functions are Turing emulable)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>  I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy
>>>>>>> form of computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects).
>>>>>>> It is fuzzy because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we
>>>>>>> cannot know which machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you
>>>>>>> need an act of faith beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense
>>>>>>> functionalism is a specific form of computationalism because
>>>>>>> functionalist assumes by default some high level of comp. They are
>>>>>>> just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware of the
>>>>>>> tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical
>>>>>>> computer scientists.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation,
>>>>>>> from you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the
>>>>>>> (immaterial) person, not the body. A body is already a
>>>>>>> representation of you, relatively to some universal numbers.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine,
>>>>>>> then 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view".
>>>>>>> He has to bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course,
>>>>>>> once we accept comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature"
>>>>>>> has already bet on it, given that the genome is digital relatively
>>>>>>> to chemistry, and given the
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ...
>>>>>>
>>>>>> read more »
>>>>>>
>>>>>
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>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/<http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>
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