On Jul 29, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> Diagonalization is a tool in theoretical computer science, to study
> the structure of what is non computable, degrees of unsolvability,
> etc. It comes from set theory, where Cantor used it to study the
> degrees of infinities of sets.
> Mecanical consept are immune for that tool, making the notion of *all
> computation* the most solid of all epistemological realities, indeed
> it makes it arithmetical, among other things.
I'm familiar enough with the Cantor set to get the gist of what you're
saying. What about non-epistemological or semi-epistemological
realities? I would define 1p as semi-epistemological.
> > Are you saying that arithmetic is primitively real, and if so, why?
> I do say that indeed.
> I believe in it, and I have never seen someone sincerely disbelieving
> It can be proved minimal in a strong sense. You can't derive the
> numbers laws from anything simpler (like logic for the early
> logicists, nor physics, nor the pure real numbers, etc). So it is
> certainly a good place to start.
> And since Gödel & Co. We know arithmetic (arithmetical truth) is
> inexhaustible, full of surprises, etc. It contains the Indra's net in
> the form a fractal web where all UMs and LUMs reflect on each others.
> It is full of life, and big bangs.
Are you saying that arithmetic is the only primitive reality though?
> That makes sense at some level. You might intuit the crazy relation
> between Bp and Bp & p.
> The introspective machine might agree with you, if you were not so
> undiplomatic as to refuse to listen to her at the start.
Haha, now who's sampling the gurujuice?
> > To
> > understand addition and multiplication you have to be a person of
> > sufficient age and competence to do that.
> You need only to be a universal machine.
Is an infant a universal machine? If so, would you say that she
understands multiplication? If so, why does she need to be taught
> > Then the theoretical frame is now the problem. Isn't that what science
> > is?
> With comp we need nothing more than a universal system. Anyone would
> do, and special one can be used to better formulate some problem, or
> even for better hiding them. Caution.
> Typically physicist search for the one which fits the most with
> observation, but this just won't do if we assume we are machines, by
> the UD Argument, notably.
The idea that comp needs nothing more than a universal system is part
of the theory of comp, right? What if that's the problem?
> > That's probably exactly what classical physicists said at the time.
> > I'm the one exploding assumptions in this case though. I'm saying that
> > we don't have to look at the universe as a 3p phenomenon pretending to
> > be 1p - it's literally both.
> That is like equating two mysteries, to pretend there is no one.
The appearance of mystery comes from our lack of an impartial vantage
point. Our 3p is not objective, it's 1p intersubjective.
> > Seems like a paradox - that the Earth is
> > both flat and round, but if you made a simulation based only on a
> > round Earth, what it looks like from space, and had never encountered
> > flatness, you would have no way of anticipating our ordinary 1p
> > experience.
> That does not follow. All you need is a theory of perspective and some
Perspective would not be imaginable were it not experienced first. It
doesn't follow logically in all possible universes.
> > Your view takes the relation between 1p and 3p for
> > granted..
> What? The study of that relation is made extremely non trivial in comp.
> Both with and without the classical knowledge theory.
Maybe I don't understand enough about how comp us used to understand
> > .that flatness is mathematically inherent in roundness -
> > which it is, but only if you know what flat is already. If you build a
> > cosmos from scratch, like a video game, with no knowledge of what you
> > are aiming for - 1p phenomenology would not inevitably follow from
> > geometry. In fact , it is literally the opposite of anything that
> > could follow from arithmetic, and that's what I'm saying; it's not
> > poetic, it's actually what the cosmos is doing...making crazy private
> > universes of experience that share a common public universe of non-
> > experience.
> Good description of what need to be explained, not assumed.
Explanation is a function of perspective and not the other way around.
To explain is to take a 3p view and relate it to another 3p view to
arrive at a 1p modeling. If there were no 1p subjectivity, nothing
would need to be or could be ex-plained, as all phenomena would be
> > We
> > should see 1p mystery objectively in it's own terms. A feeling is a
> > phenomenon. An experience is a phenomenon. There are things that we
> > can say about what they are and what they are not without reducing
> > them to their opposite (math).
> Why would it be a reduction. Physics does not go very far in the
> mathematical complexity. I think you confuse truth and the theories
> which attempt to put some light on truth. In math, those things are
> very deeply different.
They are reduction because the experience of listening to music is
significant without a formal mathematical analysis of it's structure,
while the formal analysis is not significant except in it's relation
to the 1p experience of the music.
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