On 01 Aug 2011, at 21:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Aug 1, 2:55 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
That happens with comp too, if you grasp the seventh UDA step. Our
first person experience are distributed in a non computable way in
the
universal dovetailing.
You have a good intuition, but you assume much to much. The goal is
to
explain the sense and matter without assuming sense nor matter (but
accepting the usual phenomenology of it, which is what we need to
search an explanation for).
Searching for an explanation is phenomenological too though, as are
numbers. Arithmetic is part of sense.
The fact that we know the numbers phenomenologically does not imply
that they are phenomenological.
Human arithmetic is no doubt part of human sense, but this does not
make arithmetical truth dependent on humans.
On the contrary, number theorists, logicians and computer scientist
knows that arithmetic *kicks back* (cf Johnson's principle of
reality). We know since Gödel that arithmetical truth escapes all
axiomatizable or effective theories.
A sensorimotive circuit, to
detect, model, and control. It's an experience which requires a very
specific intelligence to participate in. We can control and detect by
arithmetic modeling, but that doesn't mean the object of it's modeling
is arithmetic. I think that I'm actually assuming much less - my
primitive universe doesn't require any epiphenomena or
disqualification of appearances.
You assume matter, sense, and related them by adding infinities. You
mention electromagnetic waves which subsumes the (natural) numbers by
using trigonometry on the reals, so at this level your theory clearly
assumes more ontology or independent truth than computationalism.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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