On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
You are right, but this only means that we fail on the correct
substitution level.
If we are machine, we cannot know which machine we are, nor really
which computations go through, but we still face something partially
explainable.
Yes, substitution level is the thing. I don't see the level as a
simple point on a one dimensional continuum though.
That's correct (in the comp theory). It is a very complex lattice, but
once you say "yes" to the doctor, it can be described as a number. The
lattice becomes more complex, if you weaken the comp hypothesis, and
allow extension in the reals. But in the reals, there is no equivalent
of Church thesis, and it looks like you can prove everything, which I
take as a defect of the theories based on the reals.
It's punctuated by
qualitative paradigmatic leaps of synergy. Thus the big deal between
an organism being alive or not.
If only you could give evidences for making the theory so complex at
the start. Consciousness is no evidence for that.
The entropy cost is not uniform, just
as the different hues in the visible spectrum seem to appear to us as
qualitative regions of color despite the uniform arithmetic of
frequency on the band. Let's say that human consciousness spans the
spectrum from red (sensation) to violet (abstract thought) with
phenomena such as emotion, ego, etc in the orange-yellow-green zone. I
think that a computer chip is like taking something which is pre-
sensation (silicon detection = infra-red) and reverse engineering
around the back of the spectrum to ultra-violet: abstraction without
thought. If we want to go further backward into our visible spectrum
from the end, I think we would have to push forward more from the
beginning. You need something more sensitive than stone semiconductors
to get into the visible red wavelengths in order to have the 1p
experience get into the violet level of actual thought. Or maybe that
wouldn't work and you would have to build through each level from the
bottom (red) up.
I believe that babbage machine, if terminated, can run a program
capable to see a larger spectrum than us. Infinities and non Turing
emulability does not need to be added, there are enough of these in
the arithmetical realm, as viewed from inside.
If front of complex questions, I think it is better to start with
"simple hypothesis" and to add axioms only if strictly needed.
Especially that today, we know how "simple things" can lead to very
high complexity and very sophisticated views on that complexity.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
