On Aug 1, 4:31 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> I believe that babbage machine, if terminated, can run a program
>> capable to see a larger spectrum than us.
> > Why do you, or why should I believe that though?
> Well, it is a consequence of digital mechanism, alias computationalism.
It seems like circular reasoning to me. If you believe in comp, then
you believe math can have human experiences. I ask why I should
believe that, and you say that comp compels the belief.
> We explain, or try to explain, the complex (matter, mind, gods and
> goddesses, and all that) from the simple principles on which many
> agree, like addition and multiplication.
That's what I'm doing. Sensorimotive experience is clearly simpler
than addition and multiplication to me, and with my hypothesis, it can
be seen that this experiential principle may very well be universal.
> > I don't approach questions in terms of syntactic architecture. I'm
> > starting with nothing and adding only what appears to be necessary to
> > understanding the cosmos without leaving out anything important (like
> > life, consciousness, subjectivity).
> I have no doubt you try to understand something, but you seems to have
> no idea of what is a scientific approach, to be frank.
> We always try to assume the less, derive things, and compare with data.
Even more than always trying to do particular things, a scientific
approach should not always do what it always does. You can do both. I
have a clear vision of how these phenomena fit together and I think it
makes sense. I feel that it's up to others to test it in whatever way
> From what I (hardly) understand of your approach, you bury the Mind-
> Body problem in an infinitely low substitution level.
To me, otherwise knows as solving the Mind-Body problem.
> At least you
> acknowledge that you have to say "no" to the doctor, and that *is*
> your right. beware the crazy doctor (pro-life like) who might not ask
> for your opinion.
I'd go to the doctor that has had alternate halves of his brain
replaced for a year each.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at