On Aug 1, 1:55 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > What machine attributes are not Turing emulable? I thought Church says
> > that all real computations are Turing emulable.
> But for Church the "real computations" are what can do a finite mind
> with a finite set of transparent instructions, in a finite time, but
> with as much memory and time he needs. It is the "intuitively
> computable functions".
I didn't realize it was that limited. I wasn't thinking of real in the
sense of only physical, but if Church posits a finite 'mind' with
transparent 'instructions' then it would seem useless for emulating
qualia. Does a mind include sensation and perception? It seems very
narrow and special case begging.
>There is no reference at all with any idea of
> "real" in the sense of physically real, which is something never
> defined. David Deutsch has introduced a "physical" version of Church
> thesis, but this has no bearing at all with Church thesis. Actually I
> do think that Church thesis makes Deutsch thesis false, but I am not
> sure (yet I am sure that Church thesis + "yes doctor" leads to the
> existence of random oracle and local violation of Church thesis by
> some physical phenomena (akin to iterated self-multiplication).
So if there are machine aspects that are not Turing emulable, why
aren't they primitive?
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