On Aug 1, 1:55 pm, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > On 01 Aug 2011, at 01:12, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > What machine attributes are not Turing emulable? I thought Church says > > that all real computations are Turing emulable. > > But for Church the "real computations" are what can do a finite mind > with a finite set of transparent instructions, in a finite time, but > with as much memory and time he needs. It is the "intuitively > computable functions".
I didn't realize it was that limited. I wasn't thinking of real in the sense of only physical, but if Church posits a finite 'mind' with transparent 'instructions' then it would seem useless for emulating qualia. Does a mind include sensation and perception? It seems very narrow and special case begging. >There is no reference at all with any idea of > "real" in the sense of physically real, which is something never > defined. David Deutsch has introduced a "physical" version of Church > thesis, but this has no bearing at all with Church thesis. Actually I > do think that Church thesis makes Deutsch thesis false, but I am not > sure (yet I am sure that Church thesis + "yes doctor" leads to the > existence of random oracle and local violation of Church thesis by > some physical phenomena (akin to iterated self-multiplication). So if there are machine aspects that are not Turing emulable, why aren't they primitive? Craig http://s33light.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
