Chipping away at it.. more later.

On Jul 29, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <> wrote:
> On 28 Jul 2011, at 17:41, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > A machine cannot have an experience, it is the
> > container, it is that which is experienced,
> No. The machine itself is not experienced. The experience of the
> machine is experienced, and it may, or not, refer to some
> representational level.

Fair enough. From a truly objective perspective though, how could the
experience of the machine NOT refer to some phenomenological level. To
say that it is representational is to conflate the referent and the
signifier. In order for the machine to STOP, there doesn't
automatically need to exist a 1p experience of a red sign. In our 1p,
we see a red stop sign as a qualitative image, we understand it as a
symbolic text, we interpret it as a pragmatic condition that motivates
us to respond with motor commands to our body to push the brake, the
brake stops the car. Through our interpretation we re-present the
signifier, which is a representation-neutral experience of presented
color, shape, size, and context. As the machine is a reverse
engineered logic, we have no reason to presume that our signifier -
the red light or sign, is presented just because a command is sent to
the processor queue to stop the car when the ccd in the camera
encounters electromagnetic changes of a particular sampled
configuration. It's going to stop the car whether there is an
experience of a sign or not. I say that there is an experience, but
it's likely not remotely like a human signifier and would compare as
one piano note compared to an entire symphony, if not the sum of
hundreds of symphonies filtered through different molecular, cellular,
physiological, neurological, and psychological audiences.

> > but it has no capacity to
> > experience anything as an abstract design.
> What is abstract? What is concrete?

An abstraction is an ideal teleological signifier, having no relevant
physical qualities itself but the capacity to be used as a template to
inform both physical and ideal forms. Concrete is the opposite, a
material referent which exists physically as an objective phenomena
which is subject to the teleonomy of physical, chemical, biological

> I don't buy that there is necessarily a given physical universe. It is
> only an Aristotelian rumor, based on a gross extrapolation on our
> animal experience. But it fails, both on mind *and* matter.

I hear what you're saying, and I agree in the sense that from the
absolutely objective 0/∞p perspective there is no special difference
between physical and non-physical phenomena, but in SEE, the idea is
that existence is a relation of essential phenomena confronting it's
tail, through the involution of time-space characteristics. In this
sense both mind and matter the notions of mind and matter lose all
absolute character of abstract or concrete - it is only through
perceptual relativity which the tail is assigned material qualities
from the 1p of it's 'head'. Perceptual relativity bundles the
individual piano notes of sensorimotive experience into the qualia
chords, arpeggios, and symphonies experienced by the human 'head'. The
very experience of essence seeing it's tail as not self is one of
ontological glamor. Fear and fascination at the image of meaning and
experience involuted through spacetime - decompactified as discrete,
meaningless non-experiences.

> > A silicon chip can
> > experience that machine, but it experiences it as a single large
> > molecule.
> How do you know that?

I don't, but it makes sense to model it that way since we use silicon
for that reason, to tap into it's glass-like semiconductive
properties. Transparency, neutrality, reflection...the closest we can
get to a purely 'tail' material. You're right though, it could
experience anything and we wouldn't have any idea. Maybe it
experiences the ∞p omniscient perspective even, but I think parsimony
suggests a piano note vs chords and symphonies model.

> > Maybe we make a giant cell out of a mutant jellyfish and
> > superimpose the machine on that - then you get a different range of
> > possible experiences and sensitivities.
> That's unclear and ambiguous.

I'm saying we can get a better symphony out of a philharmonic
orchestra than a thousand drummers. Drums make us feel one way, a
cello feels a different way. Can you play cello with a million tiny
drums? Maybe. I don't think that the resonance would scale up the same
way. Can you make a cello player out of a trillion tiny drums? I doubt

> > Yellow is not
> > Turing emulable and I can imagine yellow anytime I want.
> That is not a reason why a machine cannot do that to.

There would have to be an explanation for why yellow should be any
more complex to create than a typical mechanical function. I don't see
any indication that experience of any kind can be emulated by anything
independent of something naturally capable of experiencing it. There
is no arithmetic description which could be understood by a blind
person so be able to see yellow in their mind.

> > Not completely abstract. A UM can't emulate a program having better
> > performance than it has.
> Yes, it can. A UM can emulate all programs, including transfinite
> hierachies of  relatively more performant programs. Indeed UM are self-
> speeding entities.

Are you saying that I can build a computer out of silicon that runs a
program that runs a virtual server 10x faster than the silicon
computer is able to run?

> > I can't make a virtual server run better or
> > faster than the hardware node that it's running on.
> You can, but for contingent reason related to your own most probable
> level, you lost the speed on a finite numbers on inputs. All this is
> not relevant for the reversal between physics and machine's biology/
> theology.

That's unclear to me. I'm just saying that computing can't even
emulate Everything within the realm of computation, let alone in the
greater realm of sense.

> > I don't think arithmetic can do anything by itself.
> I think you are quite wrong on this, but we may debate on the meaning
> of "doing".

When my computer begins evolving new operating systems by itself, and
when it's turned off then I would be convinced.

> >> I can appreciate a good poetical slogan to sum up a scientific
> >> theory,
> >> but such slogan per se cannot be taken as such as a theory.
> > It's not a theory, it's an observation.
> I would say it is a personal interpretation of an observation.

That's a given, but sure.

> > There is absolutely nothing about
> > an animated CAD drawing of DNA which suggests it should be associated
> > with anything that feels or thinks.
> Movies does not think, right.
> Computer does not think either. Nor brain.
> People think, thanks to brain.

Right. So how does AI 'think' like a human brain without a human

> > Space is simulated, as through mutual pantomime. It's like a
> > decompression algorithm,
> Not bad!

Thanks. I think it's pretty easy to demonstrate that space doesn't
exist, by imagining a universe with only one object in it. There can
be no change in position without some other object as a frame of
reference to create the relation of 'distance'.

> > padding the essential phenomena with null to
> > generate the existential experience of division. Time is similar, only
> > it's like a compression algorithm, collapsing energy events by self-
> > significance.
> That looks nice, but contains too many implicit statement making it
> rather abstruse.

It's just a flagpole on the new world. I'm not the settler, or the
captain, I'm the spyglass guy.

> > The brain is the neurological machine through which anthropological
> > experience is developed. Human experience is a personal anthropology
> > through which the brain achieves significance.
> That might be true at some level, but take for granted too many
> assumptions.
> Neurological machines, if they are machines at all, are Turing
> emulable, unless you thing that a neuronological machine go to analog
> states related to the special infinities that you have to add to make
> it non-turing emulable.

What you're not seeing is that non-turing emulable is the definition
of awareness. It's not due to infinities, it's due to there being a
such thing as the opposite of arithmetic which cannot be represented
within arithmetic as anything. Why can't arithmetic embrace a
mathematics of it's own involution?

> Where does the cosmos come from?

It has no where not to come from.

> > It looks like a balloon expanding to us because our bodies,
> > planet, solar system, galaxy is embedded on the surface, but
> > objectively it is not possible for the balloon to literally expand
> > since the singularity has no exterior. The result is, self-involution
> > of emptiness. Emptiness between material phenomena is space, emptiness
> > between signifying experiences (known as 'energy' in 3p exterior) is
> > time. This is why 'time flies when you're having fun'..
> You make jumps, which are hard to follow.

That's true. Sorry. I'll try not to. These convos are getting pretty
long and I get impatient.

> > Therefore all we would have to do to
> > veryify 1p experience in something else is to make it part of
> > ourselves and observe the difference.
> I am not sure that God can do that.

I think we could connect something to the brain which would let us do
that. Maybe even just magnetically induce it through the cranium.

> >> But biology shows that the identity of our atoms has no role in the
> >> building of our personal identity: metabolism changes them all the
> >> time. The geographical-physical context changes even more.
> > Sure, but is there really anything that doesn't change all the time
> > except for our own 1p experience of being who we remember ourselves to
> > be? We know that memory isn't located in specific neurons. It doesn't
> > work that way.
> OK. But it does not answer my question.

My answer is that we don't know enough about it, but that we are made
of materials that are made of atoms, so replacing them with an
arithmetic abstraction may not work any more than burning a log with
virtual fire.

> You talk like a guru. There is only theories, and the mind-body
> problem will have a formulation with respect of the theory (initial
> assumption) you choose.

Sorry. I was born in California in 1968, so I may have guru in my
blood. I don't know so much about how theories work, I'm only
interested in how sense works.

> > I don't assume infinite fine graining, I suggest ontological
> > incompatibility.
> If you believe in a cosmos, you will need infinite graining in your
> theory of mind, for relating the cosmos with your consciousness.

Why, if consciousness is not quantifiable?

> >> Arithmetic emulates all
> >> finite graining, and many sort of infinite one which can be shown to
> >> be relevant from the 1p of the machines.
> > I agree, but the 1p of the materials which host the machine are never
> > going to be the same as our 1p unless the material can experience the
> > arithmetic just like we experience it. Arithmetic itself is not an
> > experience. It requires an experiencer.
> Where does the experiencer comes from?

The experiencer is a given. It's a primary vector of orientation. It
comes from the sensorimotive interior of the cosmos being twisted into
a private balloon through the time-space involution process. We see a
cell versus a molecule but the feeling of a cell is like a larger hole
through which experience can be poured compared to a molecule. It's a
metaphor - there is no hole that can be described in three dimensions,
it's a qualitative diameter correlate, like amperes, to describe the
level of experiential 'greatness' which can be experienced.

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