Craig,
Brent decries:
 * ">That's the crux of the argument.  Do you suppose that if I were
**> decomposed in my constituent atoms I would still feel? " <*
Whereupon you answer professionally. Not with the question "What is
"FEEL"???"
Nor with the retribution that "we" are not composed of 'atoms' ONLY - so why
should these hypothetical ingredients do something like 'feeling'?
 Brent continues more reasonably about "organized matter" (still figmentous)
- while you seem to return to the figments with some "*sensorimoive
electromagnetism"  - *part of the subjective physical world. Your '*information
does not physically exist'* makes 'sense' to me,
although I wonder where the 'adult' and 'human' came in to parse(?).

To your last par: I wonder if our explanatory figment "atom" holds water in
a wider sense.
After 1/2 c in productive polymer chemical R&D I wonder if I spent that time
in a (chemical) Alice's Wunderland? Also "information'" is pretty flexible.
It should refer to 'relations'.

Regards

John Mikes


On Sat, Aug 6, 2011 at 3:23 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]>wrote:

> On Aug 6, 2:20 pm, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 8/6/2011 6:03 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >
> > > 2. Consciousness isn't a special logical design that turns inanimate
> > > objects and circuits into something that can feel. Matter feels
> > > already - or detects/reacts. Consciousness is just the same principle
> > > run through multiple organic elaborations so that it feels as the
> > > interior of an organism rather than just the interior of cells or
> > > molecules. It scales up.
> >
> > That's the crux of the argument.  Do you suppose that if I were
> > decomposed in my constituent atoms I would still feel?
>
> You wouldn't feel, but neither would something in your shape feel if
> it were composed of ping pong balls. The fundamental unit has to be
> something with the potential to build it's existing nature into
> feeling. If you are knocked unconscious you stop feeling, but your
> brain continues to make sense of itself and bring itself back into a
> condition where you will become conscious again, assuming the damage
> doesn't prohibit that.
>
> > The matter is,
> > ex hypothesi, the same.  It seems pretty clear to me that it is not the
> > matter per se that feels, it is the organized matter.  So what is it
> > about the organization that results in qualia?
>
> It's both. The relationship between the matter and it's organization
> results in sensorimotive electromagnetism, which is subjectively
> experienced as compacted qualia and objectively computed as discrete
> quantitative relationships.
>
> >  One pluasible answer is
> > that it is the way the organized matter (e.g. a neuron or a brain or a
> > computer) processes information.
>
> Right, but you have it inside out. Information is an abstraction, so
> saying that qualia is the way that organized matter processes
> information is like saying that singing is the way that the vocal
> chords process nouns and verbs. Information does not physically exist.
> It's an intellectual construct requiring adult human sanity to parse.
> Matter feels and makes sense, sense makes sense out of itself as
> information.
>
> >That it is just a property of the
> > matter is not plausible, since disorganized matter behaves much more
> simply.
>
> Elements could not have different exclusive properties if there
> weren't an inherent ability to participate in a larger organization.
> Not all elements can be configured into the same molecules. Simple or
> not, disorganized matter can't be made into whatever organization that
> you'd like, and likewise, all abstract organizations are not
> equivalent to material identities.
>
> Craig
> http://s33light.org
>
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