On 22 Aug 2011, at 22:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Aug 22, 1:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 21 Aug 2011, at 15:28, Craig Weinberg wrote:

My point is that, by definition of philosophical zombie, they behave
like normal and sane human being. It is not walking coma, or
behavior. It is full human behavior. A zombie might write a book on
consciousness, or have a diary of his dreams reports.

A movie can feature an actress writing a book on consciousness or
doing anything else that can be demonstrated audiovisually. How is
that not a zombie?

The movie lack the counterfactual. If the public shout "don't go the
cave!" to the heroine in a thriller, she will not listen.

That can be obscured by making the movie ambiguous. Having the actors
suddenly look in the camera and say something like "Did you say
something? We can't hear you very well in here." When the tension
builds the heroine could say to the camera "I know what you're
thinking, but I'm going in anyways". I think if you give the movie
anywhere near the latitude you are giving to arithmetic, you'll see
that the threshold between a movie and a UM is much less than between
a living organism and a silicon chip. You can make movies interactive
with alternate story lines that an audience can vote on, or just

If the movie is so much interactive then, it is no more a movie, but a virtual reality. If the entities behave like humans for a long time enough, I will attribute them consciousness.

Zombie are
different, they behave like you and me. By definition of philosophical
zombie, you can't distinguish it from a "real human". You can
distinguish a human from filmed human, all right?

Not without breaking the frame of reference. I can't distinguish a
live TV broadcast from a recorded broadcast. It's an audiovisual only
frame of reference. To postulate a philosophical zombie, you are
saying that nothing about them can be distinguished from a genuine
person, which is tautological. If nothing can be distinguished by
anyone or any thing at any time, then it is the genuine person, by

Not at all. I can conceptually imagine them without having consciousness "by definition". Of course with comp this lead to non sense, given that consciousness is not attached to any body, but only to soul living in Platonia. In comp we don't have a mind body problem, only a problem of illusion of bodies.

You're just saying 'an apple that is genuine in every possible way,
except that it's an orange' and using that argument to say 'then
apples can be no different than oranges in any meaningful way and
there is no reason why apples cannot be used to make an orange as long
as the substitution level is low enough.' The fallacy is that it uses
semantics of false exclusion to justify false inclusion. By insisting
that my protests that apples and oranges are both fruit but oranges
can never be made of apples is just an appeal to the false assumption
of substitution level, you disregard any possibility of seeing the
simple truth of the relation.

I don't disregard that possibility, but comp explains much more. You need the applen and the orange, and non comprehensible link. I need only the apple (to change a bit your analogy).

If you make it a 3D-hologram of an actress, with
odorama and VR touchback tactile interfaces, then is it a zombie? If
you connect this thing up to a GPS instead of a cinematically scripted
liturgy and put it in an information kiosk, does it become a zombie
then? I don't see much of a difference.

Behaviorally they have no difference with human. Conceptually they are
quite different, because they lack consciousness and any private
With comp, such zombies are non sensical, or trivial. Consciousness is
related to the abstract relations involved in the most probable
computations leading to your actual 3-states.

Yes, zombies are non sensical or trivial.

It's still just a facade which
reflects our human sense rather than the sense of an autonomous logic
which transcends programming. Even if it's really fancy programming,
it's experience has no connection with us. It's a cypher that only
intersects our awareness through it's rear end, upon which we have
drawn a face.

That is an advantage. Precise and hypothetical. Refutable.

True, but it has disadvantages as well. Dissociated and clinical.

So you say.

Meaningless. (cue 'Supertramp - The Logical Song')

So you say.

Right. These qualities cannot be proved from 3-p. Meaning and feeling
are not literal and existential. If they don't insist for you, then
you don't feel them.

Sense contingent upon the theoretical existence
of numbers (or the concrete existence of what unknowable
phenomenon is
represented theoretically as numbers)

Mathematician can study the effect of set of unknowable things.
is the beauty of what LUMs discover inside their "head", not just a big Ignorance, but that the Ignorance has a topology, a geometry, a
lot of unexpected feature.

Hopefully it isn't an unfathomably malignant and cunning evil
to evacuate the souls of unsuspecting scientists who are all too
willing to trade their humanity for a chance to peek into an abyss
empty calculation from which there is no escape. ;)

Comp does the contary of evacuating soul. It reinstall soul in
arithmetic, in a precise and testable way.

I'm ok with that, but I think that it's not a universal soul, it's
just the wireframe map of the logic of soul.

So, you are not OK with that.

No, I am ok with numbers having soul, it's just an arithmetic soul,
not a universal soul.

Sepulveda again. ---I can admit that indians have souls, but of a different nature.

This is sort of a picture of 

Don't confuse a theory with the popular human perceptions of that
theory, especially in a context where a form of obscurantism prevails
since a long time.

That picture is more of an oracle. I discovered it in the mural I did
by mirroring the far Occidental side. It was unintentional, but I
think it communicates something about the dangers of computational
extremism. To me anyways.

That's fear selling.
Extremism is prevented by the fact that the comp ethic is the right to
say "no" to the doctor. There are dangers, but that is a a reason to
study it, not to make it schedule 1.

I'm all for studying it and for consenting adults enjoying the

OK, nice.

but I think there are other options too.

Comp proves that there are other options. The comp ethics is provably the right to say "no" to the doctor, at any level. In the long run, computationalist will be those living earth through EM waves. With some luck, earth will be a museum of the carbon era.



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