On Sep 30, 4:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 30 Sep 2011, at 01:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> I don't feel this very compelling.
> >> You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization.
> > Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and
> > localization, which we do already.
> That would make my point, except it is not clear, especially with what
> you said before.
> Appearance to who, and to what kind of object?
> You loss me completely.
The matter that seems like substance to us from our naive perception
seems substantial because of what it is that we actually are. Matter
on different scales and densities might be invisible and intangible,
or like the planet as a whole, just out of range. What we experience
externally is only the liminal surfaces which face the gaps between
matter. The interior of matter is nothing like a substance, it's the
opposite of a substance, it's a sensorimotive experience over time.
The singularity is all the matter that there is, was, and will be, but
it has no exterior - no cracks made of space or time, it's all
interiority. It's feelings, images, experiences, expectations, dreams,
etc, and whatever countless other forms might exist in the cosmos. You
can use arithmetic to render an impersonation of feeling, as you can
write a song that feels arithmetic - but not all songs feel
arithmetic. You can write a poem about a color or you can write an
equation about visible electromagnetism, but neither completely
describe either color or electromagnetism.
> >> This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption
> >> which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from
> >> our
> >> direct experience.
> > Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience?
> It is better to derive from clear assumptions.
Clear assumptions can be the most misleading kind.
> >> You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me
> >> as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least
> >> describe.
> > It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is
> > panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience taking
> > place at these microcosmic levels
> But now you have to define this, and explain where the microcosmos
> illusion comes from, or your theory is circular.
I don't think there is a microcosmos illusion, unless you are talking
about the current assumptions of the Standard Model as particles.
That's not an illusion though, just a specialized interpretation that
doesn't scale up to the macrocosm. As far as where sensorimotive
phenomena comes from, it precedes causality. 'Comes from' is a
sensorimotive proposition and not the other way around. The
singularity functions inherently as supremacy of orientation, and
sense and motive are energetic functions of the difference between it
and it's existential annihilation through time and space.
> > is nothing like what we, as a
> > conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to.
> > It's more like protopsychism.
> ... and where that protopsychism come from, and what is it.
> Could you clearly separate your assumptions, and your reasoning (if
> there is any). I just try to understand.
Specifically, like if you have any two atoms, something must have a
sense of what is supposed to happen when they get close to each other.
Iron atoms have a particular way of relating that's different from
carbon atoms, and that relation can be quantified. That doesn't mean
that the relation is nothing but a quantitative skeleton. There is an
actual experience going on - an attraction, a repulsion, momentum,
acceleration...various states of holding, releasing, or binding a
'charge'. What looks like a charge to us under a microscope is in fact
a proto-feeling with an associated range of proto-motivations.
> >> The link between both remains as unexplainable as before.
> > Mind would be a sensorimotive structure.
> A physical structure? A mathematical structure? A theological structure?
No, a sensorimotive structure - which could encompass mathematical,
theological, or physical styles. It's an experience that plays out
over time and has participatory aspects. Some parts of the structure
are quite literal and map to muscle movements and discrete neural
pathways, and other ranges are lower frequency, broader, deeper, more
continuous and poetic non-structure. It's a much wider band than that
which is observable through physical instruments or computational
devices, but physical and computational aspects of the cosmos have
much precise and clear structures which exhaust our native ability to
process with mind-numbing repetition and detail.
> > The link between the
> > sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two.
Feelings and action potentials have some phenomenological overlap.
That's the link. They both map to the same changes at the same place
and time, they just face opposite directions. Electromagnetism is
public front end, sensorimotive is private back end, which for us can
focus it's attention toward the front, back, or the link in between.
> >> You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only
> >> what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some
> >> level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe
> >> when
> >> we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make three
> >> metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to
> >> notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive).
> >> Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing
> >> emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are
> >> willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions
> >> (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be).
> > The "I" is always first person.
> I don't think so. When I say that my child is hungry, I refer to a 1-I
> in the third person way. That's empathy.
You still don't call your child 'I'. You're right that sensorimotive 1-
p is sharable, as long as you are sufficiently isomorphic to the other
> And there is also a 3-I, which is the body, or its local description
> handled by the "doctor". They correspond in the theory to an abstract
> notion of Gödel number. It is our "code" (at the right level) in the
> comp frame.
> In fact there is as many notion of I than there are intensional
> variants of self-reference. They all have a role in the shaping of
The subjective is a continuum from most subjective - imagination,
interior monologue, etc to the ego, the body, clothes, possessions,
language, home, memory, friends, work, interests, etc to the
objective; partnerships, causes, philosophies, career, community,
species, planet, etc. Yes, I agree they all have a role to play in the
shaping of reality.
> > The brain or body would be third
> > person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation?
> Which one?
> Most are Turing emulated by the UD, and correspond to Turing's notion
> of Oracle computable machine. It is an open problem if such form of TM
> can exist physically, both in usual physics and in the comp physics.
> Of course there might be notions of super-Turing machine being not
> digitally emulable (even with oracle). You can use them to illustrate
> your non-comp theory. That would make your theory far clearer indeed.
I was curious about Hava Siegelmann's theories about analog
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