On Oct 1, 10:13 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 01 Oct 2011, at 03:39, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Sep 30, 4:56 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > >> On 30 Sep 2011, at 01:38, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > >>> On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > >>>> I don't feel this very compelling. > >>>> You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of > >>>> localization. > > >>> Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and > >>> localization, which we do already. > > >> That would make my point, except it is not clear, especially with > >> what > >> you said before. > >> Appearance to who, and to what kind of object? > >> You loss me completely. > > > The matter that seems like substance to us from our naive perception > > seems substantial because of what it is that we actually are. Matter > > on different scales and densities might be invisible and intangible, > > or like the planet as a whole, just out of range. What we experience > > externally is only the liminal surfaces which face the gaps between > > matter. The interior of matter is nothing like a substance, it's the > > opposite of a substance, it's a sensorimotive experience over time. > > > The singularity is all the matter that there is, was, and will be, but > > it has no exterior - no cracks made of space or time, it's all > > interiority. It's feelings, images, experiences, expectations, dreams, > > etc, and whatever countless other forms might exist in the cosmos. You > > can use arithmetic to render an impersonation of feeling, as you can > > write a song that feels arithmetic - but not all songs feel > > arithmetic. You can write a poem about a color or you can write an > > equation about visible electromagnetism, but neither completely > > describe either color or electromagnetism. > > I have no clue what you are taking about. > That your conclusion makes some arithmetical being looking like > impersonal zombie is just racism for me.
I don't think that there are any arithmetical beings. It's a fantasy, or really more of a presumption mistaking an narrow category of understanding with a cosmic primitive. > So I see a sort of racism against machine or numbers, justified by > unintelligible sentences. I know that's what you see. I think that it is the shadow of your own overconfidence in the theoretical-mechanistic perspective that you project onto me. > > > > >>>> This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption > >>>> which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from > >>>> our > >>>> direct experience. > > >>> Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience? > > >> It is better to derive from clear assumptions. > > > Clear assumptions can be the most misleading kind. > > But that is the goal. Celar assumption leads to clear misleading, > which can then be corrected with respect to facts, or repeatable > experiments. > Unclear assumptions lead to arbitrariness, racism, etc. To me the goal is to reveal the truth, regardless of the nature of the assumptions which are required to get there. If you a priori prejudice the cosmos against figurative, multivalent phenomenology then you just confirm your own bias. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems > >>>> to me > >>>> as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least > >>>> describe. > > >>> It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is > >>> panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience > >>> taking > >>> place at these microcosmic levels > > >> But now you have to define this, and explain where the microcosmos > >> illusion comes from, or your theory is circular. > > > I don't think there is a microcosmos illusion, unless you are talking > > about the current assumptions of the Standard Model as particles. > > That's not an illusion though, just a specialized interpretation that > > doesn't scale up to the macrocosm. As far as where sensorimotive > > phenomena comes from, it precedes causality. 'Comes from' is a > > sensorimotive proposition and not the other way around. The > > singularity functions inherently as supremacy of orientation, and > > sense and motive are energetic functions of the difference between it > > and it's existential annihilation through time and space. > > That does not help. > That doesn't help me either. > > > > > > > > > > >>> is nothing like what we, as a > >>> conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to. > >>> It's more like protopsychism. > > >> ... and where that protopsychism come from, and what is it. > >> Could you clearly separate your assumptions, and your reasoning (if > >> there is any). I just try to understand. > > > Specifically, like if you have any two atoms, something must have a > > sense of what is supposed to happen when they get close to each other. > > Iron atoms have a particular way of relating that's different from > > carbon atoms, and that relation can be quantified. That doesn't mean > > that the relation is nothing but a quantitative skeleton. There is an > > actual experience going on - an attraction, a repulsion, momentum, > > acceleration...various states of holding, releasing, or binding a > > 'charge'. What looks like a charge to us under a microscope is in fact > > a proto-feeling with an associated range of proto-motivations. > > Why? > Because that's what we are made of. > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> The link between both remains as unexplainable as before. > > >>> Mind would be a sensorimotive structure. > > >> A physical structure? A mathematical structure? A theological > >> structure? > > > No, a sensorimotive structure - which could encompass mathematical, > > theological, or physical styles. It's an experience that plays out > > over time and has participatory aspects. Some parts of the structure > > are quite literal and map to muscle movements and discrete neural > > pathways, and other ranges are lower frequency, broader, deeper, more > > continuous and poetic non-structure. It's a much wider band than that > > which is observable through physical instruments or computational > > devices, but physical and computational aspects of the cosmos have > > much precise and clear structures which exhaust our native ability to > > process with mind-numbing repetition and detail. > > ? > (I let you know that one of my main motivation consists in explaining > the physical, that is explaining it without using physical notions and > assumptions. The same for consciousness). But what you are explaining it with is no more explainable than physical notions or assumptions. Why explain what is real in terms which are not real? > > > > >>> The link between the > >>> sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two. > > >> ? > > Feelings and action potentials have some phenomenological overlap. > > What is feeling, what is action, what is potential? To ask what feeling is can only be sophistry. It is a primitive of human subjectivity, and possibly universal subjectivity. To experience directly, qualitatively, significantly. An action potential is an electromagnetic spike train among neurons. They can be correlated to instantiation of feelings. > > > That's the link. They both map to the same changes at the same place > > and time, they just face opposite directions. Electromagnetism is > > public front end, sensorimotive is private back end, which for us can > > focus it's attention toward the front, back, or the link in between. > > ? Electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomena are opposite sides of the same thing. I don't know how I could make it more clear. Electromagnetism is public, generic, a-signifying, and sensorimotive experience is private, proprietary and signifying. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>>> You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only > >>>> what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some > >>>> level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe > >>>> when > >>>> we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make > >>>> three > >>>> metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to > >>>> notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive). > > >>>> Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing > >>>> emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are > >>>> willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions > >>>> (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be). > > >>> The "I" is always first person. > > >> I don't think so. When I say that my child is hungry, I refer to a > >> 1-I > >> in the third person way. That's empathy. > > > You still don't call your child 'I'. You're right that sensorimotive > > 1- > > p is sharable, as long as you are sufficiently isomorphic to the other > > entity. > > That makes sense, at least by replacing "sensorimotive" by "subjective". Subjective is necessary but not sufficient to describe sensorimotive. Sensorimotive is specific to actual sensory input and motive output. You feel cold, so you choose to maybe put on a coat or turn the heater on or just ignore it. Out of the many perceptions which make up your awareness, the feeling of being cold has risen to the level of conscious attention, and out of the many responses, impulses and actions, we are motivated to choose one particular strategy to employ first - even if it's a passive strategy of doing nothing. This push and pull, receiving and sending of niche-specific, circumstantial sensemaking is the essence of subjective content as opposed to a categorization of the functional role of 'subjectivity'. > > > > >> And there is also a 3-I, which is the body, or its local description > >> handled by the "doctor". They correspond in the theory to an abstract > >> notion of Gödel number. It is our "code" (at the right level) in the > >> comp frame. > >> In fact there is as many notion of I than there are intensional > >> variants of self-reference. They all have a role in the shaping of > >> reality. > > > The subjective is a continuum from most subjective - imagination, > > interior monologue, etc to the ego, the body, clothes, possessions, > > language, home, memory, friends, work, interests, etc to the > > objective; partnerships, causes, philosophies, career, community, > > species, planet, etc. Yes, I agree they all have a role to play in the > > shaping of reality. > > OK. > > > > > > > > > > > > >>> The brain or body would be third > >>> person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation? > > >> Which one? > >> Most are Turing emulated by the UD, and correspond to Turing's notion > >> of Oracle computable machine. It is an open problem if such form of > >> TM > >> can exist physically, both in usual physics and in the comp physics. > >> Of course there might be notions of super-Turing machine being not > >> digitally emulable (even with oracle). You can use them to illustrate > >> your non-comp theory. That would make your theory far clearer indeed. > > > I was curious about Hava Siegelmann's theories about analog > > computation. > > That's material phenomenon, and they can be used to perform some > computations, but with digital mechanism, they can be recovered in the > physical reality. They can't be primitive. What if material is primitive? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.