On Oct 2, 5:01 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 01 Oct 2011, at 21:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Oct 1, 10:13 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 01 Oct 2011, at 03:39, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> The singularity is all the matter that there is, was, and will be,
> >>> but
> >>> it has no exterior - no cracks made of space or time, it's all
> >>> interiority. It's feelings, images, experiences, expectations,
> >>> dreams,
> >>> etc, and whatever countless other forms might exist in the cosmos.
> >>> You
> >>> can use arithmetic to render an impersonation of feeling, as you can
> >>> write a song that feels arithmetic - but not all songs feel
> >>> arithmetic. You can write a poem about a color or you can write an
> >>> equation about visible electromagnetism, but neither completely
> >>> describe either color or electromagnetism.
> >> I have no clue what you are taking about.
> >> That your conclusion makes some arithmetical being looking like
> >> impersonal zombie is just racism for me.
> > I don't think that there are any arithmetical beings.
> In which theory?

In reality.

> > It's a fantasy,
> > or really more of a presumption mistaking an narrow category of
> > understanding with a cosmic primitive.
> You miss the incompleteness discoveries. To believe that arithmetic is
> narrow just tell me something about you, not about arithmetic. It
> means that you have a pregodelian conception of arithmetic. We know
> today that arithmetic is beyond any conceivable effective
> axiomatizations.

I don't disagree with arithmetic being exactly what you say it is,
only that it cannot be realized except through sensorimotive
experience. Without that actualization - to be computed neurologically
or digitally in semiconductors, analogously in beer bottles, etc, then
there is only the idea of the existence of arithmetic, which also is a
sensorimotive experience or nothing at all. There is no arithmetic
'out there', it's only inside of matter.

So yes, arithmetic extends to the inconceivable and nonaxiomatizable
but the sensorimotive gestalts underlying arithmetic are much more
inconceivable and nonaxiomatizable. A greater infinity.

> >> So I see a sort of racism against machine or numbers, justified by
> >> unintelligible sentences.
> > I know that's what you see. I think that it is the shadow of your own
> > overconfidence in the theoretical-mechanistic perspective that you
> > project onto me.
> You are the one developing a philosophy making human with prosthetic
> brain less human, if not zombie.

I'm not against a prosthetic brain, I just think that it's going to
have to be made of some kind of cells that live and die, which may
mean that it has to be organic, which may mean that it has to be based
on nucleic acids. Your theory would conclude that we should see
naturally evolved brains made out of a variety of materials not based
on living cells if we look long enough. I don't think that is
necessarily the case.

> >>>>>> This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian
> >>>>>> assumption
> >>>>>> which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating
> >>>>>> from
> >>>>>> our
> >>>>>> direct experience.
> >>>>> Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience?
> >>>> It is better to derive from clear assumptions.
> >>> Clear assumptions can be the most misleading kind.
> >> But that is the goal. Celar assumption leads to clear misleading,
> >> which can then be corrected with respect to facts, or repeatable
> >> experiments.
> >> Unclear assumptions lead to arbitrariness, racism, etc.
> > To me the goal is to reveal the truth,
> That is a personal goal. I don't think that truth can be revealed,
> only questioned.

How can you question it if it is not revealed?

> > regardless of the nature of the
> > assumptions which are required to get there. If you a priori prejudice
> > the cosmos against figurative, multivalent phenomenology then you just
> > confirm your own bias.
> I don't hide this, and it is part of the scientific (modest) method. I
> assume comp, and I derive consequences in that frame. Everyone is free
> to use this for or against some world view.

It's a good method for so many things, but not everything, and I'm
only interested in solving everything.

> >>> I don't think there is a microcosmos illusion, unless you are
> >>> talking
> >>> about the current assumptions of the Standard Model as particles.
> >>> That's not an illusion though, just a specialized interpretation
> >>> that
> >>> doesn't scale up to the macrocosm. As far as where sensorimotive
> >>> phenomena comes from, it precedes causality. 'Comes from' is a
> >>> sensorimotive proposition and not the other way around. The
> >>> singularity functions inherently as supremacy of orientation, and
> >>> sense and motive are energetic functions of the difference between
> >>> it
> >>> and it's existential annihilation through time and space.
> >> That does not help.
> > That doesn't help me either.
> I mean: I don't understand. To much precise terms in a field where we
> question the meaning of even simpler terms.

I have precise terms because I have a precise understanding of what I
mean. I'm saying that causality is an epiphenomena of a feeling of
succession, which is a specific category of the sensorimotive palette,
like pain or blue. All of these feelings and experiences are generated
by the underlying dynamic of the singularity chasing it's tail through
the relatively fictional expansion of timespace.

> >>> Specifically, like if you have any two atoms, something must have a
> >>> sense of what is supposed to happen when they get close to each
> >>> other.
> >>> Iron atoms have a particular way of relating that's different from
> >>> carbon atoms, and that relation can be quantified. That doesn't mean
> >>> that the relation is nothing but a quantitative skeleton. There is
> >>> an
> >>> actual experience going on - an attraction, a repulsion, momentum,
> >>> acceleration...various states of holding, releasing, or binding a
> >>> 'charge'. What looks like a charge to us under a microscope is in
> >>> fact
> >>> a proto-feeling with an associated range of proto-motivations.
> >> Why?
> > Because that's what we are made of.
> Why should I take your words for granted.

You don't have to. You should check it out for yourself and see if it
makes sense, and if not, why not?

> >> ?
> >> (I let you know that one of my main motivation consists in explaining
> >> the physical, that is explaining it without using physical notions
> >> and
> >> assumptions. The same for consciousness).
> > But what you are explaining it with is no more explainable than
> > physical notions or assumptions. Why explain what is real in terms
> > which are not real?
> You are just begging the question. You talk like if you knew what is
> real or not.

I know that consciousness is real, and my consciousness through my
body tells me that matter is real. My consciousness also tells me that
some of it's own contents do not matter and it's perceptions do not
faithfully render what is real outside of my awareness. I would say
that arithmetic truths matter but they are not real, and therefore
cannot be manifested in a vacuum - only through some material object
which can accomodate the corresponding sensorimotive experiences. You
can't write a program that runs on a computer made of only liquid of
vapor - you need solid structures to accomodate fixed arithmetic
truths. You need the right kinds of matter to express arithmetic
truths, but matter does not need arithmetic to experience it's own

> Now it is the fact that all scientist agree with simple facts like
> 1+9=10, etc. Actually they are using such facts already in their
> theories. I just show that IF we are machine, THEN those elementary
> facts are enough to explain the less elementary one.

But since we aren't only a machine, then it's a dead end. It's
circular reasoning because you can say we can't prove we're not
machines, but the whole idea of 'proving' is mechanical so you are
just magnifying the implicit prejudice and getting further from the
non-mechanistic truths of awareness.

> >>>>> The link between the
> >>>>> sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the
> >>>>> two.
> >>>> ?
> >>> Feelings and action potentials have some phenomenological overlap.
> >> What is feeling, what is action, what is potential?
> > To ask what feeling is can only be sophistry.
> Not when addressing issues in fundamental cognitive science. Niether
> matter nor consciousness should be taken as simple elementary notions.

But numbers should be taken as elementary notions? That's the problem,
you are trying to explain awareness as an epiphenomenon of cognitive
science, when of course cognition arises from feeling (otherwise
babies would come out of the womb solving math equations instead of
crying, and civilizations should evolve binary codes before
ideographic alphabets and cave paintings).

> > It is a primitive of
> > human subjectivity, and possibly universal subjectivity. To experience
> > directly, qualitatively, significantly. An action potential is an
> > electromagnetic spike train among neurons. They can be correlated to
> > instantiation of feelings.
> I agree with all this, but that has to be explained, not as taken for
> granted.

How can any primitive be explained? If explanation is to reduce to
simpler known phenomena, and primitive is to be the simplest knowable
phenomena, then it's a contradiction to explain it any further. We can
only place it into a meaningful context, which I think my hypothesis

> >>> That's the link. They both map to the same changes at the same place
> >>> and time, they just face opposite directions. Electromagnetism is
> >>> public front end, sensorimotive is private back end, which for us
> >>> can
> >>> focus it's attention toward the front, back, or the link in between.
> >> ?
> > Electromagnetic and sensorimotive phenomena are opposite sides of the
> > same thing. I don't know how I could make it more clear.
> That is your main problem.

Ok, but what isn't clear? Opposite? 'same thing'? Electromagentism?

Electromagnetism is the name we give to the various phenomena of
matter across space - waving, attracting, repulsing, moving,
intensifying, discharging, radiating, accumulating density, surfaces,
depth, consistency, etc. Sensorimotivation is the name I'm giving to
the various phenomena of experience (energy) through time - detecting,
sensing, feeling, being, doing, intention, image, emotion, thought,
meaning, symbol, archetype, metaphor, semiotics, communication,
arithmetic, etc.

> > Electromagnetism is public, generic, a-signifying, and sensorimotive
> > experience is private, proprietary and signifying.
> That is like saying, in the machine language that electromagnestism if
> of type Bp, and sensori-motive is of type Bp & p, but I think that
> electromagnetism is of type Bp & Dt, and sensorimotive is of type of
> Bp & Dt & p.
> A part of your intuition might be accessible to computer, making your
> dismissing the possibility of comp even more premature.

What's Dt?

I think I know what Bp and p are but maybe define them longhand so I
can be sure.

> >>>>>> You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume
> >>>>>> only
> >>>>>> what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at
> >>>>>> some
> >>>>>> level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe
> >>>>>> when
> >>>>>> we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make
> >>>>>> three
> >>>>>> metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to
> >>>>>> notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive).
> >>>>>> Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing
> >>>>>> emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we
> >>>>>> are
> >>>>>> willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions
> >>>>>> (which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be).
> >>>>> The "I" is always first person.
> >>>> I don't think so. When I say that my child is hungry, I refer to a
> >>>> 1-I
> >>>> in the third person way. That's empathy.
> >>> You still don't call your child 'I'. You're right that sensorimotive
> >>> 1-
> >>> p is sharable, as long as you are sufficiently isomorphic to the
> >>> other
> >>> entity.
> >> That makes sense, at least by replacing "sensorimotive" by
> >> "subjective".
> > Subjective is necessary but not sufficient to describe sensorimotive.
> > Sensorimotive is specific to actual sensory input and motive output.
> > You feel cold, so you choose to maybe put on a coat or turn the heater
> > on or just ignore it. Out of the many perceptions which make up your
> > awareness, the feeling of being cold has risen to the level of
> > conscious attention, and out of the many responses, impulses and
> > actions, we are motivated to choose one particular strategy to employ
> > first - even if it's a passive strategy of doing nothing. This push
> > and pull, receiving and sending of niche-specific, circumstantial
> > sensemaking is the essence of subjective content as opposed to a
> > categorization of the functional role of 'subjectivity'.
> Hmm... The difference between subjective and sensorimotive would be
> captured by the difference between Bp & p, and Bp & Dt & p. That
> confirms my feeling described above.
I'll get back to you if you can explain the variables better. I tried
Googling them but nothing clear comes up for me.

> >>> I was curious about Hava Siegelmann's theories about analog
> >>> computation.
> >> That's material phenomenon, and they can be used to perform some
> >> computations, but with digital mechanism, they can be recovered in
> >> the
> >> physical reality. They can't be primitive.
> > What if material is primitive?
> Then comp is false. And you have to make this clear by assuming the
> relevant infinities.

What has to be infinite in order for comp to be false, and isn't comp
already assuming that arithmetic is non-axiomatizable and therefore

>We would also be led to the peculiar situation
> where machine could correctly prove that they are not machine,

I don't see how matter as a primitive makes machines able to prove
that they are not machines. I think a machine machine (or something we
presume is a machine) proves whether of not it is a machine by how it
responds to errors or hardware failures. You could maybe say that what
we are made of is an accumulation of the universe's favorite errors,
failures, and aberrations.

> all possible discourses of machine being of the type Bf. You might
> eventually change my mind on the non provability of comp (as opposed
> to the non recognizability of the our level of comp). For this you
> should convince the machine that material is necessarily primitive. I
> begin to doubt that non-comp can make any sense. Hmm...

If I pull the plug on the machine, then the machine halts. Why should
that be the case were machine independent of material substrate?


You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to