On 30 Sep 2011, at 01:38, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Sep 29, 10:29 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
I don't feel this very compelling.
You have to assume some primitive matter, and notion of localization.
Why? I think you only have to assume the appearance of matter and
localization, which we do already.
That would make my point, except it is not clear, especially with what
you said before.
Appearance to who, and to what kind of object?
You loss me completely.
This is the kind of strong metaphysical and aristotleian assumption
which I am not sure to see the need for, beyond extrapolating from
our
direct experience.
Is it better to extrapolate only from indirect experience?
It is better to derive from clear assumptions.
You have to assume mind, and a form of panpsychism, which seems to me
as much problematic than what it is supposed to explain or at least
describe.
It wouldn't be panpsychism exactly, any more than neurochemistry is
panbrainism. The idea is that whatever sensorimotive experience taking
place at these microcosmic levels
But now you have to define this, and explain where the microcosmos
illusion comes from, or your theory is circular.
is nothing like what we, as a
conscious collaboration of trillions of these things, can relate to.
It's more like protopsychism.
... and where that protopsychism come from, and what is it.
Could you clearly separate your assumptions, and your reasoning (if
there is any). I just try to understand.
The link between both remains as unexplainable as before.
Mind would be a sensorimotive structure.
A physical structure? A mathematical structure? A theological structure?
The link between the
sensorimotive and electromagnetic is the invariance between the two.
?
You attribute to me a metaphysical assumption, where I assume only
what is taught in high school to everyone, + the idea that at some
level matter (not primitive matter, but the matter we can observe
when
we look at our bodies) obeys deterministic laws, where you make three
metaphysical assumptions: matter, mind and a link which refer to
notion that you don't succeed to define (like sensorimotive).
Then you derive from this that the third person "I" is not Turing
emulable, but this appears to be non justified too, even if we are
willing to accept some meaning in those nanosensorimotive actions
(which I am not, for I don't have a clue about what they can be).
The "I" is always first person.
I don't think so. When I say that my child is hungry, I refer to a 1-I
in the third person way. That's empathy.
And there is also a 3-I, which is the body, or its local description
handled by the "doctor". They correspond in the theory to an abstract
notion of Gödel number. It is our "code" (at the right level) in the
comp frame.
In fact there is as many notion of I than there are intensional
variants of self-reference. They all have a role in the shaping of
reality.
The brain or body would be third
person. What do you think of Super-Turing computation?
Which one?
Most are Turing emulated by the UD, and correspond to Turing's notion
of Oracle computable machine. It is an open problem if such form of TM
can exist physically, both in usual physics and in the comp physics.
Of course there might be notions of super-Turing machine being not
digitally emulable (even with oracle). You can use them to illustrate
your non-comp theory. That would make your theory far clearer indeed.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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