On 12/6/2011 1:42 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Dec 2011, at 18:25, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2011/12/6 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
On 12/6/2011 4:11 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
The only thing that matter is digitalness... the
> fact that you run it on your pingpong ball computer
doesn't matter.
>
It does matter. If you run computations on pingpong ball
computer that
interact with the environment
This is relative to the environment. If you want to interact
with the "simulated" brain, you *must* run at the same level.
That does not preclude that the simulated brain can be run on
any level, only interaction with you require a specific level...
your level.
A human being is not a closed system. So the "substitution
level" for Bruno's argument to go thru could include digital
simulation of a large part of the universe - or maybe all of it.
Brent
Yes.
But if all the universe is needed, then computationalism is certainly
false and that would prevent any conscious AI and even if the
argument could still go through with the whole universe... it seems
really like plain old solipsism in that case.
Also, the argument is not about feasibility of capturing the
consciousness of a living person and puting it in a computer but
about the concept and the compatibility with materialism.
Yes, an environment is needed for consciousness, but I doubt that to
capture an existing consciousness (mind uploading) the level would be
more than neuronal or maybe atomic and hence the environment needed
could be feeded via input/output system without it being explicitely
included (weither the "real" one or a virtual one) in the captured
consciousness.
If we assume comp, and if the whole physical universe is needed for
the 'generalized brain', then, by comp, all the universe's states have
to be digitally accessible, and the UD will still access to those
states infinitely often. So the whole reasoning still go through, even
in the case of a concrete physical UD (step seven).
Empirically this is doubtful, though. If the quantum indeterminacy
relies on the first person indeterminacies, then we can bet that we
share the computational states of "our matter constitution" at, or
above, the quantum state of our bodies. Our level is probably above
the quantum level. This makes QM saving comp from solipsism, and is
coherent with Tegmark's argument that the brain does not exploit
quantum superpositions when handling our relevant mechanist
computational states (Sorry, Stephen). We most plausibly do share deep
dynamical histories. Beware the collision with Andromeda!
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
Hi Bruno,
Yes, I am still reading this LIst. :-) Tegmark is not even wrong
<http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&q=macroscopic+quantum+phenomena+biology&btnG=Search&as_sdt=0%2C41&as_ylo=&as_vis=1>
but I do concede the point as it is not relevant to digital substitution
but I, like Craig, caution against thinking that using classical theory
to reason about consciousness is doomed from the start. Your result, for
me, proves that material monism fails miserably as a T.O.E. but so does
ideal monism. The irony is that they fail for the exact same reason, the
problem of epiphenomena.
Onward!
Stephen
PS. I would like to see your argument against D. Deutsch's criticism of
"abstract proof theory" in his new book.
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