On Dec 8, 4:44 pm, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> On 12/8/2011 4:22 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > To suppose computation requires a material process would be
> > materialism, wouldn't it?
> Hi Craig,
> Not quite, a dualist model would require that some form of material
> process occur for computations and would go even further in prohibiting
> computations from not having a physical component but would not specify
> which it was. This way we preserve computational universality without
> having to drift off into idealism and its own set of problems.
True, it could be dualism (or an involuted monism) too, but I wouldn't
call a theory of mind which depends on material processes
computationalism. To me computationalism is a degree of arithmetic
idealism already. Isn't that the whole point, that it can be emulated
independently from any specific material? If the dualistic view can be
called computationalism then what is Bruno's view called?
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