Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 07 Dec 2011, at 18:41, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 05 Dec 2011, at 19:03, benjayk wrote:
>>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>>> I am just not arguing at all for what
>>>>>> your argument(s) seeks to refute.
>>>>> I know that. It might be your problem. You have independent  
>>>>> reason to
>>>>> *believe* in the conclusion of comp. You just seems uncomfortable
>>>>> that
>>>>> those conclusions can be extracted from comp. It looks like you  
>>>>> feel
>>>>> like this should force you to accept comp, but I have *never* say  
>>>>> so.
>>>> The point is that I can conceive to say YES, at least in theory.
>>>> I am not uncomfortable that those conclusions can be extracted from
>>>> comp,
>>>> they just can't. I pointed out your flaws in your argument over and
>>>> over
>>>> again, and you simply avoid them by stating some assumption that you
>>>> don't
>>>> make explicit in the reasoning (only the computational state can
>>>> matter) and
>>>> then saying it is equivalent to COMP.
>>> Where do I say that only the computational state can matter?
>>> Not in the assumption. Where existence of concrete material brain,  
>>> and
>>> skillful doctor, and some luck (for the level), etc. does matter, a
>>> priori.
>>> I might say something similar to what you say, but I say it only  
>>> after
>>> the step 7 and/or 8, which explains the reason why I are led to that
>>> idea.
>> The step 7 and 8 do not really work for what I am saying.
> Explain this in detail. Please.
It just doesn't deal with non-platonic-immaterialism, that's all.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The only work for
>> a certain kind of materialism, not for "sufficiently magical  
>> materialism" or
>> non-platonic-immaterialism.
> It can't work for everything which might make you doubt you will  
> survive a digital substitution qua computation, that is in virtue a  
> machine do the right corresponding computation.
But if your reaoning doesn't work for everything then the conlusion doesn't
follow. I might doubt that I survive a substitution, but I don't have to if
I don't believe in what you refuted in your argument.
So, you conclusion just follows if you believe only the alternatives you
find relevant can be true. But it's quite unreasonable to assume that.

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> You didn't refute magical materialism, BTW. You 8 steps assumes
>>>> nothing
>>>> magical is going on, and the MGA argument just refutes physical
>>>> supervenience (not physicality and consciousness are magically
>>>> related).
>>> I was just saying that I refute comp + consistency of *some* magical
>>> materialism. I do not refute magical materialism per se, nor the comp
>>> + sufficiently magical materialism. This is obvious, and that is why
>>> after step 8 a computationalist can throw such extreme magic away  
>>> with
>>> Occam razor. Thermodynamic does not refute the idea that car are
>>> pushed by invisible and discrete Kangaroos. Artificial Magic is  
>>> rarely
>>> scientifically refutable, nor interesting.
>> Maybe here is our most important disagreement. Occam is meant to  
>> eliminate
>> too complicated possibilities. It is of no use to conlude that nothing
>> "magical" or rather, non-objectifiable is going on.
>> It is not at all "artificial". A car pushed by invisible discrete  
>> kangaroos
>> is a quite complicated posibility, but that everything is driven by  
>> some
>> mysterious non-objective force is a quite simple idea that has been  
>> believed
>> for many centuries, and also is our actual experience.
> I agree.
> This is not jeopardized at all with comp. On the contrary it is shown  
> that all universal machines can see something mysterious and they can  
> realize their respective limitations, and transcend them in variate  
> ways. Of course this is more AUDA than UDA. (Some amount of  
> theoretical computer science is needed, but I can explain or give  
> references).
So we agree. But then you conlusion doesn't follow, since you failed to
eliminate the mystery beyond computations. We are not only related to
infinity of computations, we are related to an infinite mystery (which
*also* includes an infinity of computation).

Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Even your theory needs some fundamental mysterious thing (numbers or
>> computations), so you can't just eliminate fundamentally mysterious  
>> things
>> at the end of your reasoning, otherwise you have to eliminate the  
>> very basis
>> of your theory.
>> It seems you invoke some ad-hoc principle in the end to simply  
>> eliminate all
>> possbilities that you don't like.
> Proving eliminate possibilities by definition. In the frame of some  
> assumption.
That's not the problem, you are just avoiding my point. The problem is that
your principle it totally ad-hoc. "Oh, that's not good, let's just eliminate
As said, you let your favorite mystery surivive and eliminate the one you
don't like. You keep the inherent primitive infinite mystery of numbers, but
deny the *inherent/primitive* infinite mystery of matter or the *inherent*
primitive infinite mystery of consciousness, even though you have no
justification for that. You can say you don't like primitively mysterious
matter, but you can't derive that in a rational way.

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