On 01 Jan 2012, at 00:35, Pierz wrote:
When you write things like that I'm left with the impression that
you think one's
consciousness is a thing, a soul, that moves to different bundles
of computation so there
are some bundles that don't have any consciousness but could have
if you "jumped to them".
Not to wish to pre-empt Bruno's reply, but I think you're mixing up 1-
p and 3-p. From 3-p, all branches are conscious, but I only experience
myself on one branch at a time, probabilistically according to the
measure of computations. There's no individual soul, just in one sense
a single consciousness that experiences every possible state.
More on this in my reply to David, asap.
As for Mars Rover I'm curious to know this: If we programmed it to
avoid danger, would it experience fear? Until we understand the
qualia, you're as in the dark as we are on this question. You assume
the affirmative, we assume the negative. That's why I sigh. Such
arguments go nowhere but a reassertion of our biases/intuitions, and
the result is unedifying.
I disagree. We have just to make our assumptions more clear and
precise so that we get new consequences. To get the qualia, we need in
fine to abandon the primitive matter ontology, and more importantly,
the epistemological idea that physicalism is true. The physical has to
supervene on (non human) consciousness, which supervenes on all the
relations between all (universal) numbers.
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