On 3/1/2012 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 29 Feb 2012, at 21:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/29/2012 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Comp says the exact contrary: it makes matter and physical processes not completely Turing emulable.

But it makes them enough TE so that you can yes to the doctor who proposes to replace some part of your brain (which is made of matter) with a Turing emulation of it?

The doctor does not need to emulate the "matter" of my brain. This is completely not Turing *emulable*. It is only (apparently) Turing simulable, that is emulable at some digital truncation of my brain. Indeed matter is what emerges from the 1p indeterminacy on all more fine grained computations reaching my current states in arithmetic/UD.

OK, but just to clarify: The emergent matter is not emulable because there are infinitely many computations at the fine grained level reaching your current state. But it is simulable to an arbitrary degree.

But I'm still unclear on what constitutes "my current states". Why is there more than one? Is it a set of states of computations that constitutes a single state of consciousness?

Brent

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