On Tue, Apr 3, 2012 at 8:06 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> The point is that comp predicts white noise. That something else predicts
> white noise too is not relevant in the proof.

So in the setup the screen changes at RANDOM and comp predicts white noise
will be the most likely result, and you think that is significant?
Everything predicts that. OK, then I have a marvelous new thought
experiment, let X = Y. I maintain that comp predicts that X= Y and I have
made a wonderful new discovery too.

>>>   you should expect the WM duplication as equivalent with the throw of
>>> a random coin, etc. But you don't need to agree with that analysis. You
>>> need only to agree that there is an indeterminacy
>> >>  Of course there is a indeterminacy!
> > Don't say of course. That is not so obvious as your posts illustrates.

it's not obvious that the outcome of a RANDOM coin flip is uncertain? I
thought it was.

> In the 3-view there is no randomness at all. In the protocol, we don't
> change the pixels randomly, neither in the comp multiplication-movie
> experience, nor in the quantum wave which evolves deterministically. The
> point is that the randomness bears on the first person experiences. We get
> this directly with comp, without assuming QM.

Nothing new. People have only known about Quantum Mechanics for about a
century but they've known about randomness for many thousands of years. And
you've made randomness a measure of ignorance rather than a property of the
thing itself and that's how it should be, and what people have always done.
This is demonstrated by the Monty Hall problem, a new car is behind one
door and a goat behind the other two, you pick a door at random and Monty
opens a door you didn't pick and shows you a goat and gives you the
opportunity to change your choice of a door if you wish. Monty knows what
door the prize is behind and you do not, so Monty could pick the correct
door with a probability of 100% but the best you can do at first is 33.3%,
after he lest you change your choice and pick another door you know a
little more and your probability increases to 66.6%, Monty's probability
stays at 100% and the thing itself, the new car, has no probability at all.

Incidentally the great mathematician Paul Erdos admitted he could never get
his head around the Monty Hall problem and it always seemed paradoxical to
him, this despite him having no trouble whatsoever in understanding many
other things of staggering complexity and of far greater abstraction. It's

>> so if I told you before the duplication that you would see Washington
>> AND Moscow I would be correct, Bruno Marshal will indeed see both cities.
> > That the 3-view on the 1-view.

And that should be more than good enough thank you very much!

> But the probabilities bears on the 1-views themselves.

As I've said many many times before, give me a single concrete example of
two things being identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views
themselves" and you will have won this argument, do that and I will
publicly declare you've made a major philosophical discovery. Just one
example is all I ask. I think this is the key to our disagreement.

> You can ascribe the consciousness of Bruno Marshal to both, but each one
> will ascribe their present "here and now" type of consciousness only to
> themselves subjectively.

I don't know what "here and now type of consciousness" is. We both agree
that speaking of consciousness occupying a place in space has little
meaning and I would argue a absolute time for a consciousness is not a
productive idea either. You could freeze a mind for a billion years and
then start it up again and it wouldn't notice it unless it has senses that
can detect the outside world, and even then the mind couldn't tell if it
had stopped for a billion years or what it was looking at had jumped ahead
a billion years.

>> Asking why you are the Moscow man not the Washington man is exactly like
>> asking why you are Bruno Marshal and not John K Clark.
> > Possible. I do agree with this. But there is a difference. John and
> Bruno have already differentiated. But in the WM duplication experience, we
> duplicate instantaneous computational state by a special duplicator
> machine, so that we can ask the question to the guy before the duplication.

And the only answer you can receive will come from a trivial application of
the anthropic principle, "I will become the Moscow man if events transpire
so that I meet the definition of the Moscow man, namely that I see Moscow".

>> you can give no examples where according to the 3-view things are
>> identical but according to the 1-view they are not, although it's easy to
>> find examples where according to the 1-view things are identical but by the
>> 3-view they are not.
> >That's my point.

I really wish it was.

> So you grasp very well the difference between 1-view and 3-view.


> so I have no clue what difficulties you seem to have but never succeed to
> convey.

Then I will give you a clue of what my difficulty is, it has something to
do with "your point", it has too due with what you're saying right now and
the contradiction with what you were saying just a few paragraphs ago,
"That's the 3-view on the 1-view. But the probabilities bears on the
1-views themselves."

>> If things are identical objectively then they are identical
>> subjectively, the reverse is not necessarily true but it can be.
> > We agree on this since the start.

It seems that on even numbered days you agree with that but on odd number
days you do not.

> Which shows that you grasp well the 1-view and the 3-view.

Yes I grasp the difference, a bit better than you do it would seem.

> So it is weird that you still see a problem somewhere, which is just a
> confusion between the intellectual 3-view on 1-views that we can ascribe to
> other people and their own "directly knowable by each of them" 1-views.

I repeat yet again, give me a single concrete example of two things being
identical by the "3-view" but not by "the 1-views themselves" and you will
have won this argument.

> If you are read and cut in Helsinki, and pasted two days after on Mars,
> and three years after on Venus, and nowhere else, your probability,
> evaluated in Helsinki to find yourself on Mars or on Venus is the same as
> the probability evaluated if you are pasted at the same time on Venus and
> Mars. OK?

OK, the probability is the same in both, 100%.

> Do you agree that if the comp-1-indeterminacy is given by P(W) = P(M) =
> 1/2 in the WM-duplication experiment, and thus with annihilation of the
> "original" (the body of the guy in Helsinki), then the probability is 1/2
> to find oneself in Sidney, or in Washington, in this teleportation
> experiment,

I would agree that probability is a useless concept in situations like this.

> where, I repeat, the original is only read and non cut

Who cares? How is it relevant to the copies if the original is cut or not
cut as long as he's read?

 John K Clark

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