On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> >>> >  >  first place then there would be no significant difference between
> >>> >  >  passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
> >>> >  >  move
> >>> >  >  If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
> >>> >  >  the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
> >> >  Non sequitur.
> > Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> > would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> > improve its performance in any way?
> If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the 
> world, then it
> will try to form a model of itself.  But it would be difficult and extremely 
> wasteful,
> from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary to 
> model its
> own physical internal decision processes.  Failing to have this introspection 
> it may come
> to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.

Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
processes and how would that experience not be free will?

If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on

Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
(belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
contributing to making choices using free will) causing measurable
changes in the supposedly deterministic functions of the brain.


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