On 4/2/2012 1:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Apr 2, 1:33 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>  wrote:
On 4/2/2012 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:









On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net>    wrote:
On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
If all movement was involuntary in the
   >      first place then there would be no significant difference between
   >      passively watching yourself move and passively watching yourself not
   >      move
   >      If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no effect on
   >      the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor cortex.
   Non sequitur.
Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
improve its performance in any way?
If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the 
world, then it
will try to form a model of itself.  But it would be difficult and extremely 
wasteful,
from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary to 
model its
own physical internal decision processes.  Failing to have this introspection 
it may come
to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
processes and how would that experience not be free will?
Most decisions do not have an experience associated with them, we make them
'subconsciously' (e.g. the movement of my fingers in typing this).  So the 
experience of
free will is just the failure to be able to trace all the causes of a conscious 
decision.
Why are some decisions conscious, while most aren't...I'm not sure.  I think it 
has to do
with decisions for which we employee language/logic to predict consequences.



If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
readiness?
Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
(belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
contributing to making choices using free will) causing measurable
changes in the supposedly deterministic functions of the brain.
Why not?  If the brain is deterministic then beliefs are deterministic and 
changing them
by external inputs can change performance.
The belief is about the power to self determine though. The
performance change is evidence that some change is possible. There can
be more or less free will. That is not possible under determinism.

But the experiment didn't show there was more or less free will. It didn't even show there was any free will. It just showed that inducing a belief in free will changed performance. It might have also shown that belief in alien abductions changed performance. Either one is perfectly consistent with determinism.

Brent


Craig


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