On Apr 2, 1:33 pm, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> On 4/2/2012 10:02 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> > On Apr 2, 12:03 pm, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
> >> On 4/2/2012 7:14 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>>>> If all movement was involuntary in the
> >>>>>> > first place then there would be no significant difference
> >>>>>> between
> >>>>>> > passively watching yourself move and passively watching
> >>>>>> yourself not
> >>>>>> > move
> >>>>>> > If we had no free will, our belief about it should have no
> >>>>>> effect on
> >>>>>> > the actual ability to execute our wishes though our motor
> >>>>>> cortex.
> >>>>> Non sequitur.
> >>> Why? If you program a machine to believe that it has free will, how
> >>> would such a belief have any effect on its behavior? How could it
> >>> improve its performance in any way?
> >> If you program a machine to form explanatory and predictive models of the
> >> world, then it
> >> will try to form a model of itself. But it would be difficult and
> >> extremely wasteful,
> >> from a survival standpoint, to provide it the introspective data necessary
> >> to model its
> >> own physical internal decision processes. Failing to have this
> >> introspection it may come
> >> to foolishly believe in something it calls 'free will'.
> > Why would there be an experience associated with any decision
> > processes and how would that experience not be free will?
> Most decisions do not have an experience associated with them, we make them
> 'subconsciously' (e.g. the movement of my fingers in typing this). So the
> experience of
> free will is just the failure to be able to trace all the causes of a
> conscious decision.
> Why are some decisions conscious, while most aren't...I'm not sure. I think
> it has to do
> with decisions for which we employee language/logic to predict consequences.
> > If I have an experience of making decisions, then how would believing
> > that experience is real or an illusion have the effect that we see on
> > readiness?
> > Readiness is measurable. Being influenced by the nonsense idea of
> > illusory free will impacts performance negatively. If free will were
> > truly an illusion, there could be no possibility of our belief in it
> > (belief being something which is only meaningful if it pertains to
> > contributing to making choices using free will) causing measurable
> > changes in the supposedly deterministic functions of the brain.
> Why not? If the brain is deterministic then beliefs are deterministic and
> changing them
> by external inputs can change performance.
The belief is about the power to self determine though. The
performance change is evidence that some change is possible. There can
be more or less free will. That is not possible under determinism.
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