On 6/17/2012 7:54 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Jun 16, 2012  meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net 
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    > I don' believe in this spirit theory anyway; I was just trying to show it 
was a
    testable theory.

I have never understood why things are supposed to become less self-contradictory in the "spirit world" than in our world or how spirit theory is somehow fundamentally different from physical theory. If "spirit" caused X and X caused Y then both X and Y came into existence by a deterministic process. As for spirit itself there are only two possibilities, spirit came into existence for a reason or it did not, and you can say exactly the same thing about an electron.

    > Of course if you take Bruno's view then you risk making materialism an 
    theory, since no matter what result you can say,"Well it must be due to a 
    physical phenomenon."

I don't see why it *MUST* be due to a deeper physical phenomenon; nearly every physicists alive says some things have no cause and I can think of no obvious reason why what they say MUST be untrue, so I'm pretty sure they're probably right. I said I couldn't think of a reason but of course I could believe in mystical crap for no reason whatsoever, lots and lots of people do exactly that, but apparently something has caused me not to follow them and embrace the unreasoned life . And testable or not of one thing I am certain, materialism is true or it is not; although I may never know which it MUST nevertheless be true that everything happens for a reason or it does not. And I really don't think any of this is rocket science.

I don't know whether you actually misunderstand or you just gloss over the distinction for rhetorical purposes, but the question is not whether things happen for a reason or don't happen for a reason. "X or not-X." is tautologically true. The question is whether the reason has to be prior physical states. People who believe in a spirit world think not and my point is that this is testable in principle. You may object that if a person in physical state X on one occasion takes action A1 and on another occasion takes action A2, it just randomness. But if A1 and A2 and Ai...all tend to acheiving a prior stated goal of that person it is hard to maintain they are just random.


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