On 17 Jun 2012, at 19:35, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Jun 17, 2012 at  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> We can perhaps agree that consciousness-here-and-now is the only truth we know which seems undoubtable, so it might be more easy to explain the illusion of matter to consciousness than the illusion of consciousness to a piece of matter.

If consciousness is more fundamental than matter then it's difficult to explain why it's easy to find examples of matter without consciousness but nobody has yet found a single example of consciousness without matter.

This is debatable. nobody has found, nor can found, example of primitive matter. It is a metaphysical hypothesis brought by Aristotle (and of course it is a popular extrapolation among animals)

Now, it is easy, when assuming comp, to have example of consciousnes without *primitive* matter, like all experiences emerging from the arithmetical computations.

Yeah yeah I know, it's all just a illusion, but why only that illusion? Why is the "illusion" always that matter effects consciousness and consciousness effects matter if one is more fundamental than the other?

Because consciousness, to be relatively manifestable, introduced a separation between me and not me, and the "not me" below my substitution level get stable and persistent by the statistical interference between the infinitely many computations leading to my first person actual state.

So in arithmetic we can explain why numbers believe in consciousness and matter. In physics, we cannot unless we abandon comp and introduce special non turing emulable, nor first person recoverable, special infinities.

>> I don't see why it *MUST* be due to a deeper physical phenomenon; nearly every physicists alive says some things have no cause

> You might provide references.

Why? I think it would have been pompous and downright condescending to do so, you will certainly have no trouble finding such references without my help.

I don't find them. I can think only about the wave collapse, and perhaps the big bang. But I don't see this being said explicitly by physicists. It is a bit problematical for a computationalist, for the notion of "cause" is a rather fuzzy high level notion.

But if I had said "many physicist think it is a logical necessity that every event must have a cause" then THAT would indeed need references!

> Event without reason might exist but cannot be invoked to explain anything.

To say that X happened not for any physical reason and not because of God but for no reason whatsoever is a explanation and it might even be true, but the trouble is it might not be and if you assume its true and give up there is no hope of ever finding the true reason if there is one. So there is the possibility we could spend eternity looking for something that does not exist.

> To invoke them as such is just equivalent with "I dunno and will never know".

These answers to a question are all different:

1) I dunno.  (What is the capital of Wyoming?)
2) I dunno and may never know.  (Is the Goldbach Conjecture true?)
3) I dunno and will never know. (What are the first hundred digits of Chaitin's Omega Constant?)

This one, you can know, if you are patient enough. But you will not know it and also know that you know it, so you can still doubt. Chaitin's constant can be computed *in the limit*. Its decimal will stabilize, you just don't know when.

4) Although meaningful the question has no answer. (Why is there something rather than nothing?)

OK, but the question can be reduced to "why there are natural numbers obeying addition and multiplication law".

And either a chain of "why" question is infinitely long or it is not and you eventually come to a "why" question that cannot be answered because there is no reason behind it.

But this can be (and should be) accepted for the initial axioms of a theory, not for what we want to explain. A physical event without a cause or a reason does not make much sense to me (and makes no sense with comp).



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to