Hi Alberto G. Corona

Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or
feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO.


Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/11/2012 
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Alberto G. Corona 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29
Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ?


The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place because i 
so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent made of an thus going 
trough an infinite regression.
The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are ingenious 
evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a robot would implement 
such computations and still I deeply doubt about his internal notion oof self, 
his quialia etc. The best response to many questions for the shake of avooiding 
premature dogmatic closeness is to say "we don't know"
El 11/08/2012 07:57, "Stephen P. King" <stephe...@charter.net> escribi?:
>
> Hi Roger,
>
> ?? I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about 
> Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony?
>
>
>
> On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote:
>>
>> Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say
>> contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your
>> monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling
>> agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and
>> neurophilosophy.
>
>
>
> -- 
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed." 
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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