Hi Richard,
The 1p is the subjective view of one observer. It is not
inconsistent with GR proper. The problem happens when we abstract to a
3p. I claim that there is no 3p except as an abstraction, it isn't
objectively real.
On 8/23/2012 7:40 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Please tell me how 1p is inconsistent with GR.
I thought it was inconsistent with QM.
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 7:35 AM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
Hi Richard,
Yes, the tough but fun part is understanding the continuous
version of this for multiple 1p points of view so that we get
something consistent with GR.
On 8/23/2012 7:32 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Stephan,
Agreed. All possible states are present in the mind,
but IMO only one state gets to be physical at any one time,
exactly what Pratt seems to be saying.
That's why I called it an axiom or assumption.
Richard
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 7:25 AM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
Hi Richard,
I was just writing up a brief sketch... I too am
interested in a selection rule that yields one state at a
time. What I found is that this is possible using an
itterated tournament where the "winners" are the selected
states. We don't eliminate the multiverse per se as serves as
the collection or pool or menu of prior possible states that
are selected from. What is interesting about Pratt's idea is
that in the case of the finite and forgetful residuation the
menu itself is not constant, it gets selected as well.
On 8/23/2012 6:45 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Stephan,
Thanks for telling me what bisimulation means.
I was interested in that choosing only one state at a time
eliminates the multiverse.
Richard
On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 11:38 PM, Stephen P. King
<stephe...@charter.net <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>> wrote:
On 8/22/2012 4:04 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Now this is interesting: "Points have necessary
existence, all being present simultaneously in the
physical object A.
15.States are possible, making a Chu space a kind of a
Kripke structure [Gup93]:
only *one state at a time* may be chosen from the menu
X of alternatives.
Seems that divine intervention may be an assumption. I
wonder who does the choosing. May I suggest Godellian
consciousness?
Dear Richard,
No need for divine intervention! I am not sure what
"Godellian consciousness" is. Let me comment a bit more
on this part of Pratt's idea. The choice mechanism that
I have worked out uses a tournament styled system. It
basically asks the question: what is the most consistent
Boolean solution for the set of observers involved? It
seems to follow the general outlines of pricing theory
and auction theory in economics and has hints of Nash
equilibria. This makes sense since it would be modeled
by game theory. My conjecture is that quantum
entanglement allows for the connections (defined as
bisimulations) between monads to exploit EPR effects to
maximize the efficiency of the computations such that
classical signaling is not needed (which gets around the
"no windows" rule). This latter idea is still very much
unbaked.
--
Onward!
Stephen
"Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
~ Francis Bacon
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