Stephan,

Is not the method of Godel sufficient to define a consciousness
although the last step to consciousness is a leap of faith?
Richard

On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:24 AM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]>wrote:

>  Hi Richard,
>
>
> On 8/23/2012 8:01 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>
> Stephan,
>
>  But Pratt theory says that you can, and so do you for that matter.
> I attribute it to a cosmic consciousness, but that is like saying nothing.
>
>
>     Yes, but it is a good idea to leave out the "cosmic consciousness"
> idea for the purpose of constructing explanations.
>
>  A game theory mechanism would be so much more useful and convincing
> but with out eliminating the possibility of cosmic consciousness.
>
>
>     I agree but must point out that the cosmic version cannot be defined
> in terms of a single Boolean algebra. The closest thing is a superposition
> of infinitely many Boolean algebras (one for each possible consistent 1p),
> which is what we have in a logical description of a QM wave function. The
> trick is to jump from a 2-valued logic to a complex number valued logic and
> back. This just the measurement problem of QM in different language.
>
>
>  Gotta go now. Catch you later.
> Richard
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 7:56 AM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]>wrote:
>
>>  Hi Richard,
>>
>>     Yes, 3p is in the mind of the individual. We cannot turn a 3p into a
>> 1p and maintain consistency. Think of how a cubist painting (which
>> superposes different 1p) looks...
>>
>>
>>
>> On 8/23/2012 7:48 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>
>> Stephan,
>>
>>  Could you not say that 3p is in the mind but only 1p is physical?
>> I claim that whatever turns 3p into 1p is divine, by definition.
>> Richard
>>
>>  On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 7:43 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> <[email protected]>wrote:
>>
>>>  Hi Richard,
>>>
>>>     The 1p is the subjective view of one observer. It is not
>>> inconsistent with GR proper. The problem happens when we abstract to a 3p.
>>> I claim that there is no 3p except as an abstraction, it isn't objectively
>>> real.
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/23/2012 7:40 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>
>>> Please tell me how 1p is inconsistent with GR.
>>> I thought it was inconsistent with QM.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 7:35 AM, Stephen P. King 
>>> <[email protected]>wrote:
>>>
>>>>  Hi Richard,
>>>>
>>>>     Yes, the tough but fun part is understanding the continuous version
>>>> of this for multiple 1p points of view so that we get something consistent
>>>> with GR.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 8/23/2012 7:32 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Stephan,
>>>>
>>>>  Agreed. All possible states are present in the mind,
>>>> but IMO only one state gets to be physical at any one time,
>>>> exactly what Pratt seems to be saying.
>>>> That's why I called it an axiom or assumption.
>>>> Richard
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 7:25 AM, Stephen P. King <[email protected]
>>>> > wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>  Hi Richard,
>>>>>
>>>>>     I was just writing up a brief sketch... I too am interested in a
>>>>> selection rule that yields one state at a time. What I found is that this
>>>>> is possible using an itterated tournament where the "winners" are the
>>>>> selected states. We don't eliminate the multiverse per se as serves as the
>>>>> collection or pool or menu of prior possible states that are selected 
>>>>> from.
>>>>> What is interesting about Pratt's idea is that in the case of the finite
>>>>> and forgetful residuation the menu itself is not constant, it gets 
>>>>> selected
>>>>> as well.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 8/23/2012 6:45 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Stephan,
>>>>> Thanks for telling me what bisimulation means.
>>>>> I was interested in that choosing only one state at a time eliminates
>>>>> the multiverse.
>>>>> Richard
>>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 11:38 PM, Stephen P. King <
>>>>> [email protected]> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>  On 8/22/2012 4:04 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Now this is interesting: "Points have necessary existence, all being
>>>>>> present simultaneously in the physical object A.
>>>>>> 15.States are possible, making a Chu space a kind of a Kripke
>>>>>> structure [Gup93]:
>>>>>> only *one state at a time* may be chosen from the menu X
>>>>>> of alternatives.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Seems that divine intervention may be an assumption. I wonder who
>>>>>> does the choosing. May I suggest Godellian consciousness?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  Dear Richard,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>   No need for divine intervention! I am not sure what "Godellian
>>>>>> consciousness" is. Let me comment a bit more on this part of Pratt's 
>>>>>> idea.
>>>>>> The choice mechanism that I have worked out uses a tournament styled
>>>>>> system. It basically asks the question: what is the most consistent 
>>>>>> Boolean
>>>>>> solution for the set of observers involved? It seems to follow the 
>>>>>> general
>>>>>> outlines of pricing theory and auction theory in  economics and has hints
>>>>>> of Nash equilibria. This makes sense since it would be modeled by
>>>>>> game theory. My conjecture is that quantum entanglement allows for the
>>>>>> connections (defined as bisimulations)  between monads to exploit EPR
>>>>>> effects to maximize the efficiency of the computations such that 
>>>>>> classical
>>>>>> signaling is not needed (which gets around the "no windows" rule). This
>>>>>> latter idea is still very much unbaked.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>     .
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>
> --
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> "Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed."
> ~ Francis Bacon
>
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