I know and that's not science

On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:37 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  Hi Richard Ruquist
>
> My version of Leibniz is not my creation, I try
> to follow him as closely as I can.
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/23/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-23, 09:44:45
> *Subject:* Re: Pratt theory
>
>  Roger,
>
> Who cares if a theory is not substantial.
>  What matters is if the theory correctly
> or approximately models the substance.
> You are arguing against a straw man of your creation.
>
> But thank you for reminding me that ideas are emergent
> and the incompleteness of consistent systems that Godel proved,
> provides the basis for emergence.
>
> Now if only someone could explain how emergence works.
> Can Pratt theory do that?
>
>
> Richard
>
> On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>  Hi Richard Ruquist
>>  Godelian theory may or may not explain or pertain to consciousness,
>> but it is not consciousness itself. One can be conscious of an iidea,
>> but ideas are the contents of consciouness.
>>    Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> 8/23/2012
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Richard Ruquist <yann...@gmail.com>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-22, 16:04:31
>> *Subject:* Pratt theory
>>
>>   Stephan,
>>
>> Many thanks for this wonderful paper by Vaugh Pratt
>> http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf
>>
>> Pratt theory appears to replace Godellian theory.
>> But Godellian theory manifests consciousness, so some think.
>> And Pratt theory seems to apply to the interaction of physical particles
>> with each other and with the monads
>>
>> Its axioms seem reasonable- but who am I to say.
>> 1.A physical event a in the body A impresses its occurrence on a mental
>> state x of the mind X, written a=|x.
>> 2.Dually, in state x the mind infers the prior occurrence of event a,
>> written x |= a.
>> 3.States may be understood as corresponding more or less to the possible
>> worlds of a Kripke structure,
>> and events to propositions that may or may not hold in di erent worlds of
>> that structure.
>>  4.With regard to orientation, impression is causal and its direction is
>> that of time.
>> 5.Inference is logical, and logic swims upstream against time.
>> * "Prolog’s backward-chaining strategy dualizes this by viewing logic as
>> primary and time as swimming upstream against logic, *
>> * but this amounts to the same thing. The basic idea is that time and
>> logic ow in opposite directions."*
>> 6.The general nature of these inferences depends on the set K of values
>> that events can impress on states.
>> 7.Our rst distinction between body and mind will be the trivial one of
>> using di erent variables to range over these sets: A, B over bodies, X, Y
>> over minds.
>> 8.The second distinction will be in how the two kinds of sets transform
>> into each other.
>> 9.Later we make a third distinction within the objects themselves by
>> realizing the two kinds as Chu spaces with dual form factors: sets tall and
>> thin, antisets short and wide.
>> 10.We regard each point of the interval as a weighted sum of the
>> endpoints, assuming nonnegative weights p, q normalized via p + q = 1,
>> making each point the quantity p q.
>> 11.We shall arrange for Cartesian dualism to enjoy the same two basic
>> connections and the two associated properties, with mind and body in place
>> of 1 and 1 respectively.
>> 12.Minds transform with antifunctions or antisets, and "sets are
>> physical".
>> 13.Mental antifunctions/sets copy and delete, whereas physical functions
>> 'identify and adjoin'.
>> 14. "For K the set (not eld) of complex numbers, right and left
>> residuation are naturally taken to be the respective products ...
>> corresponding to respectively inner product and its dual outer product in
>> a Hilbert space"
>>
>> That "The numbers ±1 are connected in two ways, algebraic and geometric"
>> suggests how the spatial separation of the monads is equivalent to an
>> algebra.
>> This also sounds much like a straight line with points along the line
>> having the properties P,Q such that P+Q=1
>>
>> Now this is interesting: "Points have necessary existence, all being
>> present simultaneously in the physical object A.
>> 15.States are possible, making a Chu space a kind of a Kripke structure
>> [Gup93]:
>> only *one state at a time* may be chosen from the menu X of alternatives.
>>
>> Seems that divine intervention may be an assumption. I wonder who does
>> the choosing. May I suggest Godellian consciousness?
>>
>> 16. the spaces A and B play the interaction game A B, their tensor
>> product.
>> 17. The structure of ChuK is that of linear logic [Gir87], which can be
>> understood as the logic of four key structural properties:
>> it is concrete, complete, closed, and self-dual (which therefore makes it
>> also cocomplete and coconcrete).
>>
>>
>> The following implies some sort of entanglement in order to interrogate
>> all entities.
>> "When we unravel the primitive causal links contributing to secondary
>> causal
>> interaction we nd that two events, or two states, communicate with each
>> other
>> by interrogating all entities of the opposite type."
>>
>> It has been my supposition that the physical brain connects to the human
>> mind by way of entangled BECs.
>> The mind could connect to itself that way since it seems to be purely a
>> BEC.
>> So the physical brain must contain a BEC, I imagine, for this theory to
>> work.
>>
>> But I am more interested in the connection of the mind to physical
>> particles/strings.
>> Particles can become entangled, but they are not BECs.
>> Elsewhere I have proposed that every physical particle is connected to a
>> (or many) monads.
>> It appears that Pratt theory may work for a particle connected to many *or
>> all* monads.
>>
>> Thanks again,
>> Richard
>>
>>
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