Hi Richard Ruquist Leibniz does not contradict science in any way.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 13:14:59 Subject: Re: Re: Pratt theory I know and that's not science On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:37 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist My version of Leibniz is not my creation, I try to follow him as closely as I can. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 09:44:45 Subject: Re: Pratt theory Roger, Who cares if a theory is not substantial. What matters is if the theory correctly or approximately models the substance. You are arguing against a straw man of your creation. But thank you for reminding me that ideas are emergent and the incompleteness of consistent systems that Godel proved, provides the basis for emergence. Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist Godelian theory may or may not explain or pertain to consciousness, but it is not consciousness itself. One can be conscious of an iidea, but ideas are the contents of consciouness. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function." ----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-22, 16:04:31 Subject: Pratt theory Stephan, Many thanks for this wonderful paper by Vaugh Pratt http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf Pratt theory appears to replace Godellian theory. But Godellian theory manifests consciousness, so some think. And Pratt theory seems to apply to the interaction of physical particles with each other and with the monads Its axioms seem reasonable- but who am I to say. 1.A physical event a in the body A impresses its occurrence on a mental state x of the mind X, written a=|x. 2.Dually, in state x the mind infers the prior occurrence of event a, written x |= a. 3.States may be understood as corresponding more or less to the possible worlds of a Kripke structure, and events to propositions that may or may not hold in di erent worlds of that structure. 4.With regard to orientation, impression is causal and its direction is that of time. 5.Inference is logical, and logic swims upstream against time. "Prolog’s backward-chaining strategy dualizes this by viewing logic as primary and time as swimming upstream against logic, but this amounts to the same thing. The basic idea is that time and logic ow in opposite directions." 6.The general nature of these inferences depends on the set K of values that events can impress on states. 7.Our rst distinction between body and mind will be the trivial one of using di erent variables to range over these sets: A, B over bodies, X, Y over minds. 8.The second distinction will be in how the two kinds of sets transform into each other. 9.Later we make a third distinction within the objects themselves by realizing the two kinds as Chu spaces with dual form factors: sets tall and thin, antisets short and wide. 10.We regard each point of the interval as a weighted sum of the endpoints, assuming nonnegative weights p, q normalized via p + q = 1, making each point the quantity p q. 11.We shall arrange for Cartesian dualism to enjoy the same two basic connections and the two associated properties, with mind and body in place of 1 and 1 respectively. 12.Minds transform with antifunctions or antisets, and "sets are physical". 13.Mental antifunctions/sets copy and delete, whereas physical functions 'identify and adjoin'. 14. "For K the set (not eld) of complex numbers, right and left residuation are naturally taken to be the respective products ... corresponding to respectively inner product and its dual outer product in a Hilbert space" That "The numbers ±1 are connected in two ways, algebraic and geometric" suggests how the spatial separation of the monads is equivalent to an algebra. This also sounds much like a straight line with points along the line having the properties P,Q such that P+Q=1 Now this is interesting: "Points have necessary existence, all being present simultaneously in the physical object A. 15.States are possible, making a Chu space a kind of a Kripke structure [Gup93]: only one state at a time may be chosen from the menu X of alternatives. Seems that divine intervention may be an assumption. I wonder who does the choosing. May I suggest Godellian consciousness? 16. the spaces A and B play the interaction game A B, their tensor product. 17. The structure of ChuK is that of linear logic [Gir87], which can be understood as the logic of four key structural properties: it is concrete, complete, closed, and self-dual (which therefore makes it also cocomplete and coconcrete). The following implies some sort of entanglement in order to interrogate all entities. "When we unravel the primitive causal links contributing to secondary causal interaction we nd that two events, or two states, communicate with each other by interrogating all entities of the opposite type." It has been my supposition that the physical brain connects to the human mind by way of entangled BECs. The mind could connect to itself that way since it seems to be purely a BEC. So the physical brain must contain a BEC, I imagine, for this theory to work. But I am more interested in the connection of the mind to physical particles/strings. Particles can become entangled, but they are not BECs. Elsewhere I have proposed that every physical particle is connected to a (or many) monads. It appears that Pratt theory may work for a particle connected to many or all monads. Thanks again, Richard -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. 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