On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge
to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far
I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step
and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point
is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I
have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out
to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I
wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective
however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that
matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and
what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the
fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that
implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which
are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of
realism would be reckless to say the least.
Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed
with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic
materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a
universal machine would be sufficient.
That is step 6.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be
a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers,
talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to
collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as
if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and
erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where
does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by
the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do
with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp
here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.
Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what
role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more
like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is
duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I
have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.
Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the
original. That's step 5, precisely.
You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem
for you is in the assumption.
Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works,
can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.
I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:
yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the
entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but
your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by
the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed
that human individuality is a universal commodity.
Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of
resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc.
This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced
from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How
and why does data enter or exit a computation?
It is a discovery by mathematicians.
Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying
independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the
dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from
the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic
constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that.
Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull
toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors
They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness
makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp &
p is different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does
not prove it, so correct machine already knows that they might be
incorrect "soon enough".
Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and
numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.
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