On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp, and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point, since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say the least.

Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary. The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.

That is step 6.

Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers, talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?

As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract computations.

Step one talks about annihilation as well, but it is not clear what role this actually plays in the process, except to make it seem more like teleportation and less like what it actually would be, which is duplication. If I scan an original document and email the scan, I have sent a duplicate, not teleported the original.

Right. Classical teleportation = duplication + annihilation of the original. That's step 5, precisely.

You understand the reasoning very well, but we know that the problem for you is in the assumption.

I have problems with all three of the comp assumptions:

yes, doctor: This is really the sleight of hand that props up the entire thought experiment. If you agree that you are nothing but your brain function and that your brain function can be replaced by the functioning of non-brain devices, then you have already agreed that human individuality is a universal commodity.

Why? A program or piece of information is not nothing. It asks works, can be paid for, can be precious and rare, etc.

Church thesis: Views computation in isolation, irrespective of resources, supervenience on object-formed computing elements, etc. This is a theoretical theory of computation, completely divorced from realism from the start. What is it that does the computing? How and why does data enter or exit a computation?

It is a discovery by mathematicians.

Arithmetical Realism: The idea that truth values are self justifying independently of subjectivity or physics is literally a shot in the dark. Like yes, doctor, this is really swallowing the cow whole from the beginning and saying that the internal consistency of arithmetic constitutes universal supremacy without any real indication of that. Wouldn't computers tend to be self-correcting by virtue of the pull toward arithmetic truth within each logic circuit? Where do errors come from?

They come from the inadequacy between belief and truth. Incompleteness makes this unavoidable at the root, and that is why the logic of Bp & p is different from the logic of Bp, despite G* proves Bp -> p. G does not prove it, so correct machine already knows that they might be incorrect "soon enough".

Your last paragraph confirms you are still thinking of machines and numbers in a pre-Godelian or pre-Löbian way, I think.



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