On 14 Sep 2012, at 15:32, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 9/14/2012 4:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Sep 2012, at 13:17, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal and meekerdb,
ROGER: Hi meekerdb
First, science can only work with quantity, not quality, so
it only works with half a brain.
MEEKERDB [actually it is BRUNO]: Bad decision. You are the one
cutting the "corpus callosum" here.
ROGER: You have to. Quantity is an objective measure, quality is a
subjective measure.
Apples and oranges.
You are too much categorical. Qualities can have objective features
too. Modal logic, and other non standard logic are invented for
that purposes.
Geometry and topology can have non quantitative features, also.
Dear Bruno,
This concept of "objective property" is just consistency of
definition, nothing more!
Secondly, meaning is not a scientific category.
Model theory studies a form of meaning. If you decide that
something is not scientific, you make it non scientific.
If it is incapable of being falsified by physical evidence then
it is "nonscientific".
I agree.
So science
can neither make nor understand meaningful statements.
Logic has the same fatal problem.
Only if you decide so.
No, that would be "true belief" as Alberto discussed elsewhere.
If one accepts as true some set of axioms then certain properties
follow automatically. But if we look at theories in a "meta" way, we
see that there are multiple possible axioms. For example, we have
ZFC and ZF-C (with or without axiom of choice). These have very
different models.
And the fatal problem is?
BRUNO ?: Not at all. Logic handle both syntactical or digital
transformations, and its
"dual" the corresponding semantical adjoint transformation. There
is proof theory and model theory.
Meaning is handle by non syntactical mathematical structures.
There are many branches in
logic, and semantic, alias Model Theory, is one of them.
ROGER: Those are all tools for working with objective data such as
numbers or written words.
Not at all. Model studies infinite structure, some of them have no
syntactical or finite counterparts.
You are ignoring the existence of finitistic and ultrafinitistic
axioms! Maybe we need to revisit model theory.
No. Comp is finitistic. And of course not ultra-finitistic.
Then what do you do with subjective data ? Obviously you must
throw it out.
On the contrary, even with just the UDA, consciousness is the basic
notion at the base of the whole reasoning (which annoys of course
those who want to keep it under the rug). You are either a bit
unfair, or ignorant of the UDA.
Its role consists in showing that the subjective data and the 3p
stuff are not easily reconciled with comp, as we must explain the
physical 3p, from coherence condition on the subjective experience
related to computations.
We need some reason to believe that just because I have a
subjective experience of "being in the world" that this implies that
this is possible for other entities. Chalmer's argues for
panprotopsychism, the theory that everything has subjective
experience and qualia,
Every thing? I thought we are searching the things.
but does not seem to offer a hypothesis as to how. I offer
(reasoning with Vaughan Pratt) a theory that psychism follows from
Stone duality, but this limits subjectivity to the duality between
Boolean algebras (up to isomorphism) and topological spaces (up to
isomorphism).
An that might be coherent with comp. You study Pratt, so it is your
work to do that. I gave you hints.
BRUNO To separate science from religion looks nice, but it
consists in encouraging nonsense in religion, and in science
eventually.
ROGER: Religion deals mainly with subjective issues such as
values. morality, salvation, forgiveness.
These are inextended or nonphysical human/divine issues.
Yes, but that does not mean we cannot handle them with the
scientific method. If not you would not even been arguing.
It is ironic that you are taking this side of the debate, Bruno!
You, in your theory, have reduced to a epiphenomena the very thing
that allows for falsification.
Here you miss the entire point. I show comp testable, on the contrary.
And partially tested.
The Bible was not written as a scientific textbook, but as a
manual oof faith and moral practice.
OK.
Sam Harris makes a good argument for this.
Science deals entirely with objective issues such as facts,
quantity, numbers, physical data.
If you decide so, but then religious people should stop doing
factual claims, and stop proposing normatible behavior.
Science can study its own limitations, and reveal what is beyond
itself. Like in neoplatonism, science proposes a negative theology,
protecting faith from blind faith, actually.
I.e. "true belief". I agree.
BRUNO: Science cannot answer the religious question, nor even the
human question,
nor even the machine question, but it *can* reduce the nonsense.
Bruno
ROGER: You can try, which is what atheists do.
No atheists have a blind faith in a primary universe. They are
religious, despite they want not to be. A scientist aware of the
mind-body problem can only be agnostic, and continue the research
for more information. Atheists are Christian, as John Clark
illustrates so well.
I agree.
As I say, there are a few errors in facts in the Bible.
Yes, like PI = 3.
There is good evidence that the ancient Egyptians used PI =
22/7, so the PI = 3 claim is inexcusable. Perhaps this was a typo
that was continued in the hand copying of the Bible.
It was most probably a rough approximation. PI is roughly equal to 3.
That's no so bad.
But physics and chemistry have no capabability of dealing with
meaning, value, morality, salvation, etc.
OK. Like electronics cannot explain the Deep Blue chess strategy.
But computer science explains Deep Blue strategy, and it explains
already why there is something like meaning, value, morality,
salvation. Computer science deals with immaterial entity,
developing discourse on many non material things, including
knowledge, meaning, etc.
We have to consider multiple levels of explanation.
As I said, you are the one defending a reductionist conception of
machine, confusing them with "nothing but" their appearances.
Bruno
But you are not innocent of fault, Bruno. You stand accused of
defending a immaterialist conception of machine that completely
discounts (physical) appearance.
You miss the point. I defend nothing, I deduce.
You are taking universality too far.
I use Church thesis. That's all.
I contend that universality is the independence of computations to
any particular machine
That's functionalism, and is implied trivially by comp.
but there must be at least one physical system that can implement a
given computation for that computation to be knowable.
This is logically impossible. that follows non trivially from comp, as
explained in the UDA.
This is just a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of
accessible worlds.
You mix technical math with avoidance of doing the simpler technic of
UDA. That's 1004.
You are suing philosophy to avoid studying a reasoning, I'm afraid.
You should use your philosophy to isolate the flaw instead, or refine
your philosophy.
As Brent say, it is part of my goal to get an idea where the physical
laws come from, and your fuzzy "existence" is not a theory. if you
agree that matter is not primitive why are you astonished it can arise
from numbers as we know they are Turing universal, so that with comp
we have already the coherent or not dreams?
You lost me,
Bruno
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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