On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 9:46 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 9/15/2012 7:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 2:50 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:
>
>>  On 9/15/2012 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>  On 14 Sep 2012, at 18:36, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King 
>> <stephe...@charter.net>wrote:
>>
>>>   I contend that universality is the independence of computations to
>>> any particular machine but there must be at least one physical system that
>>> can implement a given computation for that computation to be knowable. This
>>> is just a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of accessible
>>> worlds <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accessibility_relation>.
>>>
>>>
>> Stephen,
>>
>>  Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'?
>>
>>  Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to
>> distinguish whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one?
>>  If so, what difference would they test to make that distinction?
>>
>>
>>  I am "philosophically" pretty well convinced by this argument.
>>
>>  But there is still a logical problem, pointed by Peter Jones (1Z) on
>> this list.
>>
>>  Peter believes that comp makes sense only for primitively material
>> machine, period.
>>
>>  So he would answer to you that the mathematical machine is just not
>> conscious, and that the distinction you ask is the difference between being
>> conscious (and material) and being non conscious at all (and immaterial).
>>
>>  I don't see any way to reply to this which does not bring the movie
>> graph, the 323 principles, and that kind of stuff into account.
>>
>>  But of course I can understand that the idea that arithmetic is full of
>> immaterial philosophical zombies is rather weird, notably because they have
>> also endless discussion on zombie, and that arithmetic contains P. Jones
>> counterpart defending in exactly his way, that *he* is material, but Peter
>> does not care as they are zombie and are not conscious, in his theory.
>>
>>
>>  In Peter's ontology, with which I have considerable empathy, they simply
>> don't exist.  "Exist" is what distinguishes material things from Platonia's
>> abstractions - of course that doesn't play so well on something called the
>> *EVERYTHING-LIST*.  :-)
>>
>>
>  Brent,
>
>  Under what theory do you (or Peter) operate under to decide whether or
> not an abstraction in platonia "exists"?
>
>
> It's not arbitrary.  None of them exist.  That's what 'abstract' means.
>
>

Your assertion that they exist only abstractly (not concretely from
anyone's perspective) is arbitrary.

Jason

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