Hi Jason Resch  

With the exception of the All, which acts like the central
processing unit of a computer, the world entities, represented
abstractly there as ideas, an act like the software and
hardware of a giant computer.  The All, like the CPU, brings
these abstractions elsewhere in Platonia into action,
something like the mind does. So the All is the "brains"
of a computer.

Platonia is what one might call the ideal aspect of the 
phenomenol  world, as in the philosophy of Idealism.
There everything is ideas, so Platonia is an abstract representation
of the phenomenol world. The phenomenol world (the world
we can touch, hear, see, etc.)  also exists as we actually see it.

In leibniz's idealism, the abstract representations if of a single
part are called monads. If multiple parts, than composite monads.

Each monad therefore is an abstraction or ideal form of an object
in the phenomenol world. In Leibniz's view, the physical events
we observe and measure in the phenomenol world obey the laws
of physics for example only through their monads, not directly.
Thus what we see is a physical representation of the monads,
And the monads, being ideas, can be treated as computer 
software and hardware. These are moderated and controlled
(causing their physical forms to act according to the laws),
by what is called the Supreme Monad, which serves the same purpose as 
the main computer chip in the central processing unit. 
In Platonia this is called the All.  In Christianity it is called
God. 



Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
9/17/2012  
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him  
so that everything could function." 
----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Jason Resch  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-09-15, 22:36:59 
Subject: Re: science only works with half a brain 





On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 2:50 PM, meekerdb  wrote: 

On 9/15/2012 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:  


On 14 Sep 2012, at 18:36, Jason Resch wrote: 





On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King  wrote: 

? contend that universality is the independence of computations to any 
particular machine but there must be at least one physical system that can 
implement a given computation for that computation to be knowable. This is just 
a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of accessible worlds. 




Stephen, 


Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'? 


Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to distinguish 
whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one? ?f so, what 
difference would they test to make that distinction? 


I am "philosophically" pretty well convinced by this argument.? 


But there is still a logical problem, pointed by Peter Jones (1Z) on this list. 


Peter believes that comp makes sense only for primitively material machine, 
period.? 


So he would answer to you that the mathematical machine is just not conscious, 
and that the distinction you ask is the difference between being conscious (and 
material) and being non conscious at all (and immaterial). 


I don't see any way to reply to this which does not bring the movie graph, the 
323 principles, and that kind of stuff into account. 


But of course I can understand that the idea that arithmetic is full of 
immaterial philosophical zombies is rather weird, notably because they have 
also endless discussion on zombie, and that arithmetic contains P. Jones 
counterpart defending in exactly his way, that *he* is material, but Peter does 
not care as they are zombie and are not conscious, in his theory. 


In Peter's ontology, with which I have considerable empathy, they simply don't 
exist.? "Exist" is what distinguishes material things from Platonia's 
abstractions - of course that doesn't play so well on something called the 
*EVERYTHING-LIST*.? :-) 




Brent, 


Under what theory do you (or Peter) operate under to decide whether or not an 
abstraction in platonia "exists"? ?t seems arbitrary and rather biased to 
confer this property only to those abstractions that happen to be nearest to 
us. 


Why should this additional property, namely "existence", make any difference 
regarding which structures in platonia can have the property of conscious? ?t 
seems like this would lead to abstract objects that are only "abstractly 
conscious" and concrete objects which have the full-fledged "concrete 
consciousness". ?fter all, we say that 2 is even, not that it is "abstractly 
even". ?f some program in platonia is conscious, is it abstractly conscious or 
just conscious? 


I think our existence in this universe makes the conclusion clear. ?n other 
branch of the wave function, or in other physical universes predicted by string 
theory, our universe exists only as an abstraction, yet our relative 
abstraction (to some entities) does not makes us into zombies. ?hy should there 
be no symmetry in this regard? ?ow can our abstractions be zombies, while their 
abstractions are conscious? 


Jason? 
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