Hi meekerdb 

What exists physically has extension. That would be the phenomenol world.
What exist as non-extensive (nonphysical) mental representations of the real 
world components 
are abstractions or idea entities in what is called Platonia

Usually when we say that something "exists" we mean that it physically exists.
The abstract entities in Platonia are made to seem like the physical objects
they represent, and to seem to interact as they do, by the All. 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/17/2012 
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: meekerdb 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-09-15, 22:46:04
Subject: Re: science only works with half a brain


On 9/15/2012 7:36 PM, Jason Resch wrote: 



On Sat, Sep 15, 2012 at 2:50 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

On 9/15/2012 8:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 


On 14 Sep 2012, at 18:36, Jason Resch wrote:





On Fri, Sep 14, 2012 at 8:32 AM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:

 I contend that universality is the independence of computations to any 
particular machine but there must be at least one physical system that can 
implement a given computation for that computation to be knowable. This is just 
a accessibility question, in the Kripke sense of accessible worlds.




Stephen,


Could you provide a definition of what you mean by 'physical system'?


Do you think it is possible, even in theory, for entities to distinguish 
whether they are in a physical system or a mathematical one?  If so, what 
difference would they test to make that distinction?


I am "philosophically" pretty well convinced by this argument. 


But there is still a logical problem, pointed by Peter Jones (1Z) on this list.


Peter believes that comp makes sense only for primitively material machine, 
period. 


So he would answer to you that the mathematical machine is just not conscious, 
and that the distinction you ask is the difference between being conscious (and 
material) and being non conscious at all (and immaterial).


I don't see any way to reply to this which does not bring the movie graph, the 
323 principles, and that kind of stuff into account.


But of course I can understand that the idea that arithmetic is full of 
immaterial philosophical zombies is rather weird, notably because they have 
also endless discussion on zombie, and that arithmetic contains P. Jones 
counterpart defending in exactly his way, that *he* is material, but Peter does 
not care as they are zombie and are not conscious, in his theory.


In Peter's ontology, with which I have considerable empathy, they simply don't 
exist.  "Exist" is what distinguishes material things from Platonia's 
abstractions - of course that doesn't play so well on something called the 
*EVERYTHING-LIST*.  :-)




Brent,


Under what theory do you (or Peter) operate under to decide whether or not an 
abstraction in platonia "exists"?  


It's not arbitrary.  None of them exist.  That's what 'abstract' means.

Brent


It seems arbitrary and rather biased to confer this property only to those 
abstractions that happen to be nearest to us.


Why should this additional property, namely "existence", make any difference 
regarding which structures in platonia can have the property of conscious?  It 
seems like this would lead to abstract objects that are only "abstractly 
conscious" and concrete objects which have the full-fledged "concrete 
consciousness".  After all, we say that 2 is even, not that it is "abstractly 
even".  If some program in platonia is conscious, is it abstractly conscious or 
just conscious?


I think our existence in this universe makes the conclusion clear.  In other 
branch of the wave function, or in other physical universes predicted by string 
theory, our universe exists only as an abstraction, yet our relative 
abstraction (to some entities) does not makes us into zombies.  Why should 
there be no symmetry in this regard?  How can our abstractions be zombies, 
while their abstractions are conscious?


Jason 
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