# Re: Numbers in Space

On Friday, September 21, 2012 4:18:47 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 20 Sep 2012, at 19:16, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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> On Thursday, September 20, 2012 12:26:07 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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>> On 20 Sep 2012, at 17:02, Craig Weinberg wrote:
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>> > Here's another reductio ad absurdum illustration of comp.
>> >
>> > If the version of comp we are discussing here is independent of
>> > physics, then shouldn't it be possible for us to program universal
>> > machines using only empty space?
>>
>> You are quite quick here, but have a good insight, as comp makes space
>> non clonable, indeterministic in the details, and plausibly Turing
>> universal, as QM confirms. The 0-body problem (the quantum vacuum) is
>> already Turing universal (I think). For classical physics you need
>> three bodies at least).
>>
>>
> What about an ideal vacuum? Just lengths multiplying and adding enumerated
> bundles of lengths. No quantum.
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> It would not be Turing universal.
>

If it isn't then that seems to me an argument for primitive physics.

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>> > Length can be quantified, so why can't we just use millimeters or
>> > Planck lengths as the basis for our enumeration, addition, and
>> > multiplication and directly program from our mind to space?
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>> Who we? In the universe nearby it costs a lot of energy/money/time to
>> handle matter already gigantic compared to the Planck length.
>>
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>> Or are you suggesting we are already simulated by the quantum vacuum.
>> Very plausible, but comp asks for justifying this in arithmetic.
>>
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> I'm saying that whatever program we access when we choose what we think
> about should be able to run just as easily in space as it does through the
> brain.
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> Or just arithmetic. You don't need space. Only addition and multiplication
> of integers. Or justapplication and abstraction on lambda terms, etc.
>

I was going to do another post upping the ante from Numbers in Space to
Numbers in Xpace (imaginary space). To me this is the fading qualia
argument that could be a Waterloo for comp. The transition from Turing
machines executed in matter to execution in space and then xpace would have
to be consistent to support the claim that arithmetic is independent from
physics. If that isn't the case, why not? What is different other than
physical properties between matter, space, and xpace?

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> I should be able to pick an area of my house and leave a bunch of memories
> there and then come back to them later just be occupying the same space.
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> Not at all. You are distributed in the whole UD*. You can go back to your
> memory only if the measure on computations makes such a persistence
> possible. This needs to be justified with the self-reference logics, and
> that is what is done with S4Grz1, Z1* and X1*.
>

I don't know what that means exactly but if I am getting the gist, it still
doesn't tell me why it is easier for me to remember something in my mind
than to offload my memories onto objects, places, times of the year,
whatever. Why not make a Turing machine out of time that uses moments
instead of tape and tape instead of numbers? It seems to me that the
universality of UMs is wildly overstated.

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> That's if we define space as relative to my house and not the rotating
> planet, revolving sun, etc.
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> So it sounds like you are not opposed to this idea of computation with no
> resources whatsoever besides space,
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> No need for spaces. To invoke it is already too much physicalist for comp.
>

So we can pretty much call comp magic then. It needs nothing whatsoever and
can ultimately control anything from anywhere.

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> provided that it could be justified arithmetically (which I don't
> understand why it wouldn't be. how does comp know if it's running on matter
> or space?)
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> By UDA. Anything physical must be justified with the "material
> hypostases". Up to now, this works, even by giving the shadows of the
> reason why destructive interference of the computations occurs below our
> substitution level.
>

Why doesn't anything arithmetic need to be justified with "computational
hypostases"?

Craig

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> Bruno
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>> >
>> > Of course, it would be hard to know where it was because we would be
>> > constantly flying away from a space that was anchored to an absolute
>> > position independent of Earth, the solar system, Milky Way, etc, but
>> > that shouldn't matter anyhow since whatever method we use to
>> > directly program in empty space with our minds should also give us
>> > access to the results of the computations.
>>
>> ?
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> I mean if I could stand completely still then the planet would fly off
> from under my feet and I would be left standing exactly where I was with
> the Earth revolving past me at 107,000 km/hr. I would occupy the same space
> while the Earth, Sun, and galaxy sweep away from me.
>
> If instead of me, it was memories I had stashed away in space, then my
> body would be soon separated from the absolute position that I had placed
> them. It shouldn't matter though, since by the same method of thinking
> numbers into space, I should be able to retrieve them too, regardless of
> the distance between my body and the numbers.
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>> >
>> > What do you think? Just as wafers of silicon glass could in theory
>> > be functionally identical to a living brain, wouldn't it be equally
>> > prejudiced to say that empty space isn't good enough to host the
>> > computations of silicon?
>>
>> Empty space, in any turing universal theory, is equivalent with
>> universal dovetailing. It is a trivial theory, as when we assume comp,
>> the space and belief in spaces have to be justified through number
>> "dreams" statistics.
>>
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> So you are saying yes to the space doctor?
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>> The advantage of comp is that we can use math and more easily reason
>> clearly. We can formulate key parts of the mind body problem
>> mathematically.
>>
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> I don't question that, and I think that it may ultimately be the only way
> of engineering mind body solutions - but I still think that if we really
> want to know the truth about mind body, we can only find that in the
> un-numbered, un-named meta-juxtapostions of experienced sense.
>
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>>
>> And computationalists are cool as they don't think twice before giving
>> the restaurant menu to the puppet who asks politely. They don't judge
>> people from their religion, skin color, clothes, or if made of wood,
>> or metal or flesh, as long as they behave respectfully of course.
>>
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> I can behave respectfully to a puppet too, but I feel hypocritical because
> I wouldn't change places with them for any reason.
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>>
>> Bruno
>>
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>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>>
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