On 22 Sep 2012, at 11:25, Roger Clough wrote:

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical existence.

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant.

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist.

R^3 is extended, but is not physical. The Mandelbrot set is extended, but is not physical.




What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond.

Thus I can truthfully say,
for example, that God does not exist.
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]
is the world we are aware of through our senses,
and that persists independently without them."

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not "really" there.

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime
because it is extended.


I don't what is spacetime. I work on where spacetime oir space time hallucinations come from.




At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions,
still have physical presence.

I don't understand. the "physical" is what need an explanation, notably when you assume comp.



Leibniz refers to these as "well-founded phenomena." You can still stub your toe on
phenomenological rocks.

Yes. But this is more an argument that phenomenological rocks can make you stub the toe, even when non extended, like when being virtual or arithmetical.




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence


On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,
I would say of such things that they live, since life has
such attributes.

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.

Plato's One is a special case, saince it is a monad of monads,

OK, it makes sense with mùonad of monads = universal machine/number, and monad = machine/number.



And more esoteric thinking treats numbers more as beings:

http://supertarot.co.uk/westcott/monad.htm

BRUNO: The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use.


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).


Bruno

ROGER: You lost me, except I believe that a main part of confusion and disagreement on this list
comes because of multiple meanings of the word "exists",
which brings me back to where I started:


I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical (extended) existence.


Which brings me back to my statement: this will not help.

You can use this in the mundane life, or even when doing physics (although with QM, even this is no more clear). But if you serach a TOE, it is clearer to clearly distinguish what you assume to exist at the start, and what exists by derivation, and what exists in the mind of the self-aware creatures appearing by derivation.

Keep in mind that the UD arrgument is supposed, at the least, to show that the TOE is just arithmetic (or anything Turing equivalent), and that the physical reality has to be recovered mathematically by the statistical interference of number's dream. That is an exercise in theoretical computer science. We can recover more, as we can get a large non communicable, but "hopable" or "fearable", part.

Bruno





= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ======================================================================


----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.


Bruno











--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical existence.

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant.

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist.
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond.

Thus I can truthfully say,
for example, that God does not exist.
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]
is the world we are aware of through our senses,
and that persists independently without them."

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not "really" there.

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well- founded phenomena." You can still stub your toe on
phenomenological rocks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence

On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,
I would say of such things that they live, since life has
such attributes.

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.

ROGER: I'm not sure, but I think you're probably right and I was wrong. Living things change, numbers do not change.

ROGER: Hi Bruno Marchal

I think we should only use the word "exists" only when we are
referring to physical existence.

BRUNO: Hmm.... That might aggravate the naturalist or materialist human penchant.

ROGER: Why ? Naturalist and materialist entities are extended and so physically exist.
What I say here is how I think Leibniz would respond.

Thus I can truthfully say,
for example, that God does not exist.
Wikipedia says, "In common usage, it [existence]
is the world we are aware of through our senses,
and that persists independently without them."

BRUNO: But that points on the whole problem. With comp and QM, even when you observe the moon, it is not "really" there.

ROGER: Yes it is. Although I observe the moon phenomenologically, it still has physical existence in spacetime because it is extended. At least that's Leibniz' position, namely that phenomena, although illusions, still have physical presence. Leibniz refers to these as "well- founded phenomena." You can still stub your toe on
phenomenological rocks.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence

On the other hand, Platonia, Plotinus, Plato, Kant and Leibniz,
take the opposite view or what is real and what exists. To them ideas
and other nonphysical items such as numbers or anything not extended in space,
anything outside of spacetime are what exist, the physical world out
there is merely an appearance, a phenomenon. Following Leibniz,
I would say of such things that they live, since life has
such attributes.

BRUNO: Hmm... Then numbers lives, but with comp, only universal or Lobian numbers can be said reasonably enough to be living. You might go to far. Even in Plato, the No? content (all the ideas) is richer that its living part. I doubt Plato would have said that a circle is living. Life will need the soul to enact life in the intelligible.

ROGER: I'm not sure, but I think you're probably right and I was wrong. Living things change, numbers do not change.
f man as a mental or
living being.



The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use.


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).


Bruno







----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.


Bruno











--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



The person and its body.

BRRUNO: OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use.


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).


Bruno







----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.


Bruno











--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



ROGER: I'm not sure, but I think you're probably right and I was wrong. Living things change, numbers do not change.
f man as a mental or
living being.



The person and its body. OK. For the term "exist" I think we should allow all reading, and just ask people to remind us of the sense before the use.


With comp, all the exists comes from the "ExP(x)" use in arithmetic, and their arithmetical epistemological version, like []Ex[]P(x), or []<>Ex[]<>P(x), etc.


That gives a testable toy theology (testable as such a theology contains the physics as a subpart).


Bruno







----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-21, 04:10:52
Subject: Re: Numbers in Space




On 21 Sep 2012, at 03:28, Stephen P. King wrote:


On 9/20/2012 12:14 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 20, 2012 11:48:15 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:




It's not doing the computations that is hard, the computations are already there. The problem is learning their results.

The problem is doing anything in the first place. Computations don't do anything at all. The reason that we do things is that we are not computations. We use computations. We can program things, but we can't thing programs without something to thing them with. This is a fatal flaw. If Platonia exists, it makes no sense for anything other than Platonia to exist. It would be redundant to go through the formality of executing any function is already executed non-locally. Why 'do' anything?


Bruno can 't answer that question. He is afraid that it will corrupt Olympia.



Not at all, the answer is easy here. In the big picture, that is arithmetic, nothing is done. The computations are already "done" in it. "doing things" is a relative internal notion coming from the first person perspectives.


Also, Platonia does not really exist, nor God, as existence is what belongs to Platonia. Comp follows Plotinus on this, both God and Matter does not belong to the category exist (ontologically). They are epistemological beings.


Bruno











--
Onward!

Stephen

http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to