Craig, The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. Names are not important. Richard
On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: >> >> Craig, >> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. > > > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that > doesn't...bleed? > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) > >> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory >> monads.. >> >> For example take the binding problem where: >> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different >> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single >> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for >> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial >> location" >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: >> >> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? > >> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads >> perhaps to solve the binding problem >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > > > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an > experiencer? > > Craig > >> >> Richard >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
