On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 2:32:40 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
>
> Craig, 
> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. 
> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. 
> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. 
> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. 
> Names are not important. 
> Richard 
>
>
I agree that the names aren't important, but why are there two different 
unrelated kinds of experiences? Do the monads make the neurons, and if so, 
why? Or do the neurons make monads, and again, why? If you have either one, 
why have the other?

Craig
 

>
> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
> >> 
> >> Craig, 
> >> 
> >> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the 
> >> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if 
> >> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then 
> >> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. 
> >> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. 
> > 
> > 
> > I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I 
> think 
> > that what you are describing would be technically categorized as 
> > interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed 
> to be 
> > two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that 
> > doesn't...bleed? 
> > (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory 
> >> monads.. 
> >> 
> >> For example take the binding problem where: 
> >> "There  are  an  almost  infinite  number  of  possible, different 
> >> objects we are capable of seeing,  There  cannot  be  a  single 
> >> neuron,  often  referred  to  as  a  grandmother  cell,  for  each 
> >> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) 
> >> However, at a density of 10^90/cc 
> >> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), 
> >> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for 
> >> "all different  values  of  depth,  motion,  color, and  spatial 
> >> location" 
> >> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: 
> >> 
> >> 
> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>  
>
> > 
> > 
> > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only 
> tries 
> > to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually 
> > suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The 
> > hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? 
> > 
> >> 
> >> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things 
> >> because of the BEC entanglement connection. 
> >> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory 
> >> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness 
> >> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads 
> >> perhaps to solve the binding problem 
> >> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. 
> > 
> > 
> > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and 
> > neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in 
> what 
> > we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human 
> > consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum 
> > framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this 
> > capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble 
> > perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring 
> an 
> > experiencer? 
> > 
> > Craig 
> > 
> >> 
> >> Richard 
> >> 
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