On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:
> Craig, 
> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the 
> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if 
> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then 
> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. 
> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. 

I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think 
that what you are describing would be technically categorized as 
interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to 
be two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that 

> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory 
> monads.. 
> For example take the binding problem where: 
> "There  are  an  almost  infinite  number  of  possible, different 
> objects we are capable of seeing,  There  cannot  be  a  single 
> neuron,  often  referred  to  as  a  grandmother  cell,  for  each 
> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) 
> However, at a density of 10^90/cc 
> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), 
> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for 
> "all different  values  of  depth,  motion,  color, and  spatial 
>  location" 
> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: 
> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)

I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries 
to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually 
suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The 
hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? 

> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things 
> because of the BEC entanglement connection. 
> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory 
> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness 
> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads 
> perhaps to solve the binding problem 
> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. 

This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and 
neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in 
what we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human 
consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum 
framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this 
capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble 
perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an 


> Richard 

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