On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: > > Craig, > > I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the > substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if > consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then > the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. > So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. >
I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think that what you are describing would be technically categorized as interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to be two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that doesn't...bleed? (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) > Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory > monads.. > > For example take the binding problem where: > "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different > objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single > neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each > one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) > However, at a density of 10^90/cc > (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), > the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for > "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial > location" > ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: > > http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html) > > > I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? > So the monads and the neurons experience the same things > because of the BEC entanglement connection. > These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory > that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness > and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads > perhaps to solve the binding problem > and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. > This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in what we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an experiencer? Craig > Richard > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/SK1WBWfunroJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
