Hi Richard Ruquist 

So what's your problem ? 


Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
10/12/2012  
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 


----- Receiving the following content -----  
From: Richard Ruquist  
Receiver: everything-list  
Time: 2012-10-11, 11:35:29 
Subject: Re: Re: Impossible connections 


Roger, 
I know Brian Greene personally and have read his book, Fabric of the Cosmos. 
He was a postdoc at my school. He is not a founder of string theory, 
Max Green is. 
His view of space is quite conventional except for the extra 
dimensions of string theory. 
Richard 


On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 10:39 AM, Roger Clough  wrote: 
> Hi Richard, 
> 
> The most entertaining way to understand the views of modern physics 
> on space (same as that of Leibniz) would be to watch 
> 
> NOVA | The Fabric of the Cosmos: What Is Space (Brian Greene, a founder of 
> sgtring theory) 
> 
> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CD5tBIqJU4U&playnext=1&list=PLYslgvtKtawg5gknf6QmpFRqdqkwYAs7H&feature=results_main
>  
> 
> 
> or go to 
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_relativity 
> 
> 
> Concepts introduced by the theories of relativity include: 
> 
> " Measurements of various quantities are relative to the velocities of 
> observers. In particular, space and time can dilate. 
> Spacetime: space and time should be considered together and in relation to 
> each other. 
> The speed of light is nonetheless invariant, the same for all observers." 
> 
> or 
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space 
> 
> 
> "In the seventeenth century, the philosophy of space and time emerged as a 
> central issue in epistemology and metaphysics. 
> At its heart, Gottfried Leibniz, the German philosopher-mathematician, and 
> Isaac Newton, the English physicist-mathematician, 
> set out two opposing theories of what space is. Rather than being an entity 
> that independently 
> exists over and above other matter, Leibniz held that space is no more than 
> the collection of spatial relations between objects in the world 
> "space is that which results from places taken together".[5] Unoccupied 
> regions are those that could have objects in them, and thus spatial relations 
> with other places. 
> For Leibniz, then, space was an idealised abstraction from the relations 
> between individual entities or their possible locations and therefore could 
> not be continuous but must be discrete.[6] Space could be thought of in a 
> similar way to the relations between family members. Although people in the 
> family are related to one another, 
> the relations do not exist independently of the people.[7] Leibniz argued 
> that space could not exist independently of objects in the world because that 
> implies a difference between 
> two universes exactly alike except for the location of the material world in 
> each universe. But since there would be no observational way of telling these 
> universes apart then, according to the identity of indiscernibles, there 
> would be no real difference between them. According to the principle of 
> sufficient reason, 
> any theory of space that implied that there could be these two possible 
> universes, must therefore be wrong.[8] 
> 
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 
> 10/11/2012 
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
> 
> 
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> From: Craig Weinberg 
> Receiver: everything-list 
> Time: 2012-10-11, 08:11:17 
> Subject: Re: Impossible connections 
> 
> 
> I agree with Roger on this one (except for the insults). I did not know that 
> Einstein recognized that spacetime was a true void - I had assumed that his 
> conception of gravitational warping of spacetime was a literal plenum or 
> manifold, but if it's true that he recognized spacetime as an abstraction, 
> then that is good news for me. It places cosmos firmly in the physics of 
> private perception and spacetime as the participatory realizer of public 
> bodies. 
> 
> Craig 
> 
> PS Roger, you wouldn't happen to have any citations or articles where 
> Einstein's view on this are discussed, would you? I'll Google it myself, but 
> figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks. 
> 
> On Thursday, October 11, 2012 7:59:39 AM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
> Roger, You are entitled to your opinion, but that is all it is. 
> Richard 
> 
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2012 at 5:31 AM, Roger Clough wrote: 
>> Hi Richard Ruquist 
>> 
>> Here you go again. Monads are basically ideas. 
>> The BECs are physical. No physical connection is possible 
>> between ideas and things. 
>> 
>> 
>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net 
>> 10/11/2012 
>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen 
>> 
>> 
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> From: Richard Ruquist 
>> Receiver: everything-list 
>> Time: 2012-10-10, 14:32:39 
>> Subject: Re: Re: more firewalls 
>> 
>> 
>> Craig, 
>> The experiencers are the monads and the physical neurons.. 
>> I conjure experiencers because I have experiences. 
>> But it appears that two kinds of experiencers are necessary. 
>> The BEC just connects them. I do not care what you call that. 
>> Names are not important. 
>> Richard 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2012 at 1:45 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2012 12:47:47 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote: 
>>>> 
>>>> Craig, 
>>>> 
>>>> I claim that a connection is needed in substance dualism between the 
>>>> substance of the mind and the substance of the brain. That is, if 
>>>> consciousness resides in a BEC in the brain and also in the mind, then 
>>>> the two can become entangled and essentially be copies of each other. 
>>>> So the BEC connection mechanism supports substance dualism. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I understand what you are saying. Not to be a weenie, but just fyi I think 
>>> that what you are describing would be technically categorized as 
>>> interactionism and/or parallelism, since substance dualism is supposed to 
>>> be 
>>> two unconnected substances - a brain that doesn't think and a mind that 
>>> doesn't...bleed? 
>>> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_%28philosophy_of_mind%29) 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Substance dualism then solves the hard problem using string theory 
>>>> monads.. 
>>>> 
>>>> For example take the binding problem where: 
>>>> "There are an almost infinite number of possible, different 
>>>> objects we are capable of seeing, There cannot be a single 
>>>> neuron, often referred to as a grandmother cell, for each 
>>>> one." (http://papers.klab.caltech.edu/22/1/148.pdf) 
>>>> However, at a density of 10^90/cc 
>>>> (from string theory; e.g., ST Yau, The Shape of Inner Space), 
>>>> the binding problem can be solved by configurations of monads for 
>>>> "all different values of depth, motion, color, and spatial 
>>>> location" 
>>>> ever sensed. (I have a model that backs this up: 
>>>> 
>>>> http://yanniru.blogspot.com/2012/04/implications-of-conjectured-megaverse.html)
>>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I think that you are still dealing with a mechanical model which only tries 
>>> to account for the complexity of consciousness, not one which actually 
>>> suggests that such a model could have a reason to experience itself. The 
>>> hard problem is 'why is there any such thing as experience at all'? 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> So the monads and the neurons experience the same things 
>>>> because of the BEC entanglement connection. 
>>>> These experiences are stored physically in short-term memory 
>>>> that Crick and Kock claim is essential to physical consciousness 
>>>> and the experiences in my model are also stored in the monads 
>>>> perhaps to solve the binding problem 
>>>> and at least for computational support of physical consciousness. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> This is more of a quantum method of closing the gap between physics and 
>>> neurophysiology, but it doesn't really suggest why that would result in 
>>> what 
>>> we experience. Like Orch-OR, I'm not opposed to the idea of human 
>>> consciousness being instantiated by a particular neuroscientific-quantum 
>>> framework, but it still doesn't touch the hard problem. Why does this 
>>> capacity to experience exist at all? Can't a BEC or microtubule ensemble 
>>> perform each and every function that you say it does without conjuring an 
>>> experiencer? 
>>> 
>>> Craig 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Richard 
>>>> 
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